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ABSTRACT 
The Colombian government has been fighting the FARC for more than forty 
years and since 2002 has proven to be more effective in it. However, in the last 
years a link of support has arisen between the FARC and Hugo Chávez’s 
Bolivarian government of Venezuela. The FARC’s Bolivarian Campaign for a 
New Colombia has intertwined with the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela and 
by doing so, the FARC has guaranteed for itself not only an ideological vessel to 
export its revolutionary project throughout Latin America, but also a stronghold in 
the neighboring country.  
In order to analyze both movements, elements of Social Movement 
Theory provides a general theoretical framework for understanding why the two 
organizations are attracted to each other and how the transformation of 
Venezuela has allowed the presence of terrorist groups in its territory. 
The result of the analysis here are conclusive. The government of 
Venezuela’s support for the FARC goes well beyond sympathy with its political 
objectives and even now, more terrorist organizations (such as ETA) are starting 
to use Venezuela as a safe haven. 
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During his annual state of the nation address to the National Assembly on 
January 11, 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, asked Colombian 
President, Alvaro Uribe, to restart the dialogue between the two of them by first 
recognizing the FARC1 and the ELN2 as belligerents rather than terrorists: 
… I say it even though it can upset somebody: the FARC and the 
ELN are not terrorist groups; they are armies. Truly armies, they 
are truly armies [sic] that occupy a space in Colombia, that occupy 
a space [sic]. Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces and the 
National Liberation Army of Colombia must be given recognition 
[status of belligerency]. Those are insurgent forces that have a 
political project, that have a Bolivarian project that is respected 
here, respected here [sic].  
I request to the governments of the continent that the FARC and 
ELN be removed–those that have label like that those guerrilla 
insurgent forces–from the list of terrorist groups, that be removed. I 
request that Europe remove the FARC and the ELN from the 
world’s terrorist groups list, because that only has one cause, the 
pressure from United States. 
…Therefore, Mr. Colombian President, I would like to resume the 
dialogue with you, but in a new level. I ask you that we start by 
giving recognition [status of belligerency] to the FARC and the ELN 
as Colombian insurgent forces and as opposed as terrorist groups. 
And so I ask the governments of this continent and the world’s 
governments…3 
The day before President Chávez’s announcement, the FARC released 
two political hostages in the jungles of Colombia. These hostages were handed 
over to a Venezuelan commission led by the Minister of Interior, Ramon 
Rodriguez Chacin. When he received the hostages, he told the on-site FARC 
                                            
1 FARC stands for Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces in Spanish. 
2 ELN stands for National Liberation Army in Spanish. 
3 Scribd.com, “Discurso Hugo Chavez AN-11 Enero 2008,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
1036303/Discurso-Hugo-Chavez-AN11enero2008 (Accessed July 13, 2010). 
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commander, “I have a message from President Chávez for you. We are very 
aware of your struggle and ask you to maintain this effort. You can count on us.”4 
The Colombian government’s response to Chávez’s speech was 
immediate. That same day, in a communiqué read by the press secretary of the 
president, the government reminded that the use of the appellative, “terrorist,” for 
FARC is justified, as the group seeks to attack a legitimately constituted 
democracy with tactics that are, in many cases, unacceptable and condemned by 
international law. The FARC is considered a terrorist group because it kidnaps, 
indiscriminately places bombs, attacks villages disregarding their inhabitants, 
forces the recruitment of children as a practice to maintain their numbers, and 
places landmines in any rural area. In addition, the group is funded by the 
narcotrafficking business.5 The United States, the European Union, and a few 
other countries have designated the Colombian guerrilla groups, especially 
FARC, as terrorist groups since 2001 and 2002.6 On the same day as Chávez’s 
speech, Argentina, Spain, France, and Guatemala rejected the proposal. Even 
the Spanish judge, Baltazar Garzon considered Chávez’s proposal as cynical.7 
According to Hugo Chávez, both entities share a common ideological 
belief in the “Bolivarian project.”  In order to understand his request, this thesis 
addresses four key research questions:  
 
                                            
4 Gustavo Coronel, “From Petrostate to Narcostate, Political Corruption in Hugo Chavez’s 
Venezuela,” Centro de Divulgacion del Conocimiento Economico CEDICE, September 2009, 
http://www.cedice.org.ve/fotos/file/Documento%20Gustavo%20Coronel%20Ingles.pdf (Accessed 
July 15, 2010), 6. 
5 Presidencia de la Republica, Colombia, Colombian Government Press Communiqué, 
January 11, 2008, January 11, 2008, http://web.presidencia.gov.co/sp/2008/enero/11/ 
07112008.html (Accessed July 17, 2010).   
6 The FARC was not put in the terrorist list until after 9/11. Unfortunately, many of its 
practices have been used by the FARC’s enemies, especially the conservative paramilitary 
organizations that rose and fell in ways that were connected to the FARC’s own trajectory. 
7 “Crecen Voces en Contra de la Peticion de Hugo Chavez de darle caracter politico a las 
FARC y al ELN,” El Tiempo, January 12, 2008, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/ 
CMS-3918293 (Accessed July 17, 2010). 
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1. Why is there a link between the FARC and the Venezuelan 
government? 
2. Why does the Venezuelan government want to support the FARC?  
3. How does the Venezuelan government support the FARC?  
4. Why does the FARC want the Venezuelan government’s support?  
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
In order to answer these questions, this thesis will analyze the Bolivarian 
movement in Venezuela and how it intertwines with and supports the FARC’s 
new ideological platform, the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia. The 
purpose of this research is to examine to what extent Venezuela supports the 
FARC, and how an increase in that support would affect Colombia’s national 
security and the Colombian effort to counter the FARC’s actions. 
While there are several organizations that are related to both movements 
(e.g., the Sao Paulo Forum and the Continental Bolivarian Coordinator), this 
thesis will limit its scope to only the Venezuelan Bolivarian Movement and the 
FARC (the Continental Bolivarian Coordinator will be briefly discussed). Another 
topic that will be addressed but not analyzed in any detail is the ties that both 
entities allegedly have with foreign terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and ETA. 
C. THESIS METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
The thesis draws on elements of contemporary social movement theory as 
a theoretical framework. By doing so, an analysis will be presented on the rise 
and sustenance of both movements. Government reports, news articles, studies 
made by experts and other material will support the analysis. 
Chapter I covers the event in which Hugo Chávez requests that FARC’s 
status as a terrorist organization be reviewed as well as discussing the thesis’s 
purpose, scope and organization. Chapter II discusses social movement theory, 
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specifically the Political Process model developed by Doug McAdam.8 Chapter III 
presents a history of the FARC, its growth and its current-status in Colombia. 
Chapter IV analyzes the factors that allowed the FARC to become an insurgency 
and their relevance now. Chapter V discusses the political transformation of 
Venezuela, from a liberal democracy to a Socialist democracy. Chapter VI 
outlines the factors that led to the emergence of the Bolivarian Revolution and 
XXI Century Socialism. Chapter VII examines the links between the Venezuelan 
Government and the FARC and explores the extent to which this collaboration 
exists. Chapter VIII summarizes the conclusions of the research. 
                                            
8 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 36. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to analyze the interface and collaboration between the Colombian 
Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Venezuelan Bolivarian Revolution, it is 
necessary to first understand the history and analyze the components of both 
movements. To do so this chapter draws on contemporary social movement 
theory, in particular the political process model developed by Doug McAdam.9  
B. POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL 
The emergence of any social movement or insurgency comes from the 
desire to change the status quo in a society, when some individuals become 
angry enough with the system to do something about it. The most prominent 
theory is the “political process model.” This model takes not only takes into 
account the grievances of individuals and the willingness of such individuals to 
mobilize in order bring about change (i.e., development of an insurgent 
consciousness), but also the resources needed in order to mobilize (i.e., increase 
in organizational resources) and a political environment that is “open” to 
insurgency formation (i.e., expansion of political opportunities). Independently, 
these factors are not enough to generate an insurgency, but when they come 
together, the possibility that an insurgency will emerge becomes more likely.10 
1. Expansion of Political Opportunities 
Oppressed populations often seek to promote change in society, but the 
opportunities to do so are rare and fluctuate over time. Only when these 
opportunities become more prevalent can a budding social movement have any 
                                            
9 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 36. 
10 Sean Everton, “Social Movement Theory” (working paper, Dark Networks, Graduate 
School of Operational & Information Sciences, Defense Analysis Department, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2010), 1.  
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hope of successfully mobilizing.11 What leads to the expansion of political 
opportunities? “Any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the 
calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is 
structured.”12 According to the model, political opportunities manifest themselves 
in three primary ways: political instability, enhanced political positions of the 
aggrieved populations, and ideological openness.13 
a. Political Instability 
Political instability occurs when elite control of the existing power 
structure weakens. Any short-term event, such as natural disasters, economic 
crisis, and armed conflict, can shake the foundations of the political 
establishment. In such situations, the political establishment often has to expend 
political capital and resources in order to counter any movement that tries to 
exploit the situation.14 This raises the probability that it will push through reforms 
that benefit the aggrieved population in order to maintain its dominance.15 
b. Enhanced Political Positions 
“Successful insurgencies typically do not emerge merely because 
of widespread political instability, but also because of broad social processes that 
have strengthened the aggrieved population’s political power.”16 road social 
changes that occur over extended periods can enhance the political standing of 
an aggrieved population.17  
                                            
11 Jeremy A. Bartel and Moises M. Nayve, ”The Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM) 
and the Rise of Radical Islamic Converts in the Philippines: A Major Security Concern” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 8.        
12 McAdam, Political Process, 41. 
13 McAdam, Political Process, 42. 
14 McAdam, Political Process, 42. 
15 Christian Smith, The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and the Social 
Movement Theory (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), 59.   
16 Sean Everton, “Social Movement Theory” (working paper, Dark Networks, Graduate 
School of Operational & Information Sciences, Defense Analysis Department, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2010), 1.  
17 Bartel and Nayve, The Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement, 8. 
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c. Ideological Openness 
Moreover, broad social changes can lead the social environment to 
tolerate alternative, critical, and even subversive ideas and worldviews espoused 
by the aggrieved population and other associated movements.18 “Since the 
exercise of power is often closely linked to the manipulation of ideas, the 
expansion of freedom of thought and expression combined with an influx of 
creative, critical ideas may result in a marked increase in political opportunity for 
potential movement groups.”19 
Any of these three factors can contribute to the expansion of 
political opportunities for emerging insurgent movements. However, the ability to 
act upon these opportunities depends on the resources available. 
2. Increase in Organizational Resources 
Even if an aggrieved population or movement encounters the perfect 
environment to emerge due to prevalent political opportunities, capitalizing on the 
opportunity depends on the organizational resources available to mobilize and 
the subsequently sustain of the movement. “A conducive political environment 
only affords the aggrieved population the opportunity for successful insurgent 
action. It is the resources of the minority that enable insurgent groups to exploit 
these opportunities.”20 These resources can vary, and they include the education 
of the members of the group, the financial resources of supporters, the 
organizations from which the aggrieved population can recruit individuals, and 




                                            
18 Everton, Social Movement Theory, 2. 
19 Smith, The Emergence of Liberation Theology, 59. 
20 McAdam, Political Process, 43. 
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action plans.21 However, probably the most important resources are indigenous 
ones that contribute several key elements such as “members, leaders, solidarity 
incentives, communication networks, and enterprise tools.”22   
3. Development of an Insurgent Consciousness 
People are unlikely to support a process of social change if they are 
satisfied with the current political system and environment. Instead, an emerging 
social movement needs to attract those who are unhappy with the perceived 
status quo and convince them that collectively they can do something about the 
situation. “Discontent by itself does not produce social movements; there needs 
to be a transformation of consciousness. People must recognize that they share 
these grievances with others and believe that they can do something about 
them.”23  In other words, people must come to believe that change is not only 
necessary but also possible. This transformation is “the development of an 
insurgent consciousness, which is a collective state of understanding that 
perceives, interprets and explains a social situation in such a way that it compels 
people to organize and act in order to change the social situation.”24  Since new 
movements cannot expect that all potential members will be able to understand 
fully the group’s ideology, a movement’s leaders must be able to frame the 
movement’s ideology in ways that attract and retain followers.25  
C. CONCLUSION 
When the conditions outlined above are present (i.e., expanding political 
opportunities, increase in organizational resources, development of an insurgent 
consciousness), insurgent formation becomes more likely. The Political Process 
 
                                            
21 Everton, Social Movement Theory, 3. 
22 Bartel and Nayve, The Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement, 9. 
23 Bartel and Nayve, The Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement, 12. 
24 Smith, The Emergence of Liberation Theology, 61. 
25 Everton, Social Movement Theory, 3.  
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Model will be used in the following chapters as the theoretical framework in order 
to analyze the emergence of the FARC and the Bolivarian Revolution. 
Meanwhile, Chapter III will present a history of the FARC. 
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III. COLOMBIAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES (FARC) 
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the FARC’s history. The FARC is the oldest and 
was at its height the largest “guerrilla” group in the world. Its official formation 
occurred in 1964, with a Marxist-Leninist orientation. While active in Colombia, it 
did not earn the designation as a terrorist group until 2001 after 9/11.26 This 
chapter covers the conditions that led to the FARC’s birth, growth, strategic 
planning, sources of financing, achievements, and an assessment of the current 
situation. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Up until 1991, Colombia had only two viable political parties: the Liberal 
Party and the Conservative Party. In 1946, the Conservative Party won the 
presidential elections with Mariano Ospina Perez as its candidate. Consequently, 
the Liberal Party joined forces under Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a popular and 
charismatic leader who promised land reform, and selected him as their 
candidate for the 1950 presidential elections. On April 9, 1948, however, Gaitan 
was assassinated in Bogota, an event that triggered tremendous upheaval in the 
country’s capital city. 
1. La Violencia 
In response to the outbreak of violence, guerrilla groups affiliated with 
Liberal, Conservative, and Communist parties formed throughout the country. In 
1949, the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) tried to take advantage of the 
chaos and called on these guerrillas to organize the masses and lead them in an 
armed resistance against the government.  The situation created by widespread 
                                            
26 Unlike Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, the FARC’s primary focus has been on 
Colombia although they have been involved in different activities in many countries around the 
world. 
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violence enabled General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla to become the President by 
means of a political coup d’état on June 13, 1953. The National Assembly later 
recognized him as the legitimate President of Colombia. 
During his time as President, Pinilla promoted amnesty for the guerrilla 
groups throughout the country; however, some groups remained active, 
especially the communist-oriented ones. These guerrilla groups moved to 
Tolima27 where they created an armed group aligned with the Communist Party 
and called itself the “popular masses self-defense group.”  Its purpose was to 
establish some sort of local co-government. 
 
Figure 1.   Map of Colombia (From IGAC) 
                                            
27 Tolima is a State in Colombia, located south of the capital city, Bogota. 
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2. National Front 
Due to pressure from the population, General Pinilla relinquished the 
Presidency in 1957 to a Military Board comprised of five General officers, who 
served as a transitional government. In 1958, the two constitutional political 
parties agreed to share the government every four years and called this the 
“National Front.” During this time, the remaining guerrilla groups transformed 
themselves into agrarian self-defense movements with the goal of establishing 
“Independent Republics.” During 1960, one such guerrilla group named itself the 
“Marquetalia Self-Defense Movement,” declared that Marquetalia28 was an 
“Independent Republic,” and elected Pedro Antonio Marin, also known as (aka), 
“Tirofijo,” as its leader. 
In 1964, the Colombian government launched the “Marquetalia 
Operation,” which tasked the Army and the Air Force to suppress both this 
guerrilla group and others located to the south. The operation succeeded in 
recovering the territory, but the nucleus of the guerrilla group escaped.  
3. Southern Bloc 
After the Marquetalia Operation, the movement joined with other guerrilla 
groups, and they held the first (FARC) Conference29 at the end of 1964.  At this 
conference, the groups agreed to form a single organization named the 
“Southern Armed Bloc” and returned to Marquetalia to develop a base area. At 
the same conference, the group wrote its “Agrarian Reform Plan,” which argued 
that the land should be given back to the peasants and that the monopoly of the 
big landowners should end. 
                                            
28 Marquetalia is a county in Tolima state. 
29 FARC’s maximum decision instance. It is comprised by the Secretariat, the Central 
General Staff and by a representation from all guerrilla structures and its conclusions relate to 
strategic projections, goals, objectives, procedures and ideology. 
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C. BIRTH AND GROWTH   
1. From Southern Armed Bloc to Colombian Revolutionary 
Armed Forces 
At the end of 1966, the Southern Armed Bloc held the Second Guerrilla 
Conference. It changed its name to the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces 
(FARC) and set its birth date back to May 27, 1964. The group appointed Pedro 
Antonio Marin, aka Manuel Marulanda Velez or Tirofijo, as its Commander. 
During this Conference, the FARC developed its founding charter and stated that 
its purpose was “to end social, political and economical inequality, the U.S. 
military and financial intervention in Colombia, through the establishment of a 
Marxist-Leninist and Bolivarian State.”30 The Central General Staff (EMC) of the 
FARC recognized that the organization needed to grow. Consequently, it created 
new guerrilla fronts, adopted guerrilla tactics, and attempted to indoctrinate the 
masses in order to fulfill its political goals. 
During the following years, the FARC grew in terms of both numbers and 
fronts, and it held four more conferences that outlined the group’s objectives for 
the future: 
• Third Conference (1969): During this Conference, the group 
ordered the opening of a fourth front in the region known as 
Magdalena Medio (Magdalena river valley), located between the 
states of Boyaca and Santander. The Central General Staff also 
ordered the creation of urban cells in charge of finances. They 
numbered around 300 men and 3 fronts. 
• Fourth Conference (1971): This Conference ended with the 
creation of a fifth front in Uraba (northwest – borders with Panama) 
and the first outline of a strategic plan to attack the government in 
the military, economic and transportation fields. At this time, the 
FARC had around 450 men and 4 fronts. 
• Fifth Conference (1974): The Central General Staff increased to 13 
members, the Secretariat appeared and the group formed a 
counter intelligence apparatus. At this time, the FARC had 600 men 
and 5 fronts. 
                                            
30 Discovery en Español, “Fuga de las FARC,” http://www.tudiscovery.com/web/FARC/farc/ 
(Accessed July 15, 2010). 
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• Sixth Conference (1978): At this conference, the FARC articulated 
the need to double the size of each front and unfold them in order 
to have a presence in each Colombian state. At the end of 1978, 
the FARC had 1,200 men and 14 fronts, and their financial support 
came from small-scale extortions.31  
 
Figure 2.   FARC’s growth by 1978 (From ESICI) 
D. SEVENTH CONFERENCE 
The Seventh Conference took place in May 1982. Even though the FARC 
had previously outlined a plan, the group developed a strategic plan to seize 





                                            
31 Daniel Pécault, Las FARC: Una Guerrilla sin fin o sin fines? (Bogota: Grupo Editorial 
Norma, 2008), 89. 
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Colombia. It also embraced the PCC Maxim of “the combination of all forms of 
struggle.”32 The FARC added the initials EP to its name, which stands for the 
People’s Army. 
1. The Strategic Plan 
Initially, the FARC had adopted guerrilla warfare in its most basic form of 
confrontation. Now, however, the group decided to embrace Mao Tse-tung’s 
Popular Protracted War (PPW) model, with the modifications of Truong Chinh 
and Vo Nguyen Giap developed during the Vietnam War. According to Mao, a 
guerrilla group adopting the PPW had to pass through the following three 
sequential stages to seize power: Strategic Defense, Strategic Equilibrium, and 
Strategic Offensive.33 However, the Vietnamese modifications placed more 
emphasis on conventional military operations and on the concept of “mobile 
warfare,”  as the transition from defensive guerrilla tactics to offensive 
conventional operations.34 Giap’s modifications hold that a guerrilla force does 
not need to follow a sequential program when moving from one stage to another. 
The three stages could be present and forces could switch back and forth among 
them, employing guerrilla, mobile, and positional warfare.35    
The FARC Strategic Plan identified three stages in its struggle: 
• A general offensive throughout the country in order to weaken the 
military forces and the government and to generate chaos. 
• The installation of a provisional government composed by 
revolutionary members. 
• The defense of the revolution to exterminate any army remaining 
forces and consolidate the government. 
                                            
32 Partido Comunista Colombiano, “Historia del PCC 1930-2008 78 años de lucha,” 
http://www.pacocol.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=334 (Accessed July 16, 
2010). 
33 Ian W. F. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies (New York: Routledge, 
2001), 74–75. 
34 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, 80. 
35 Florian Waitl, “Mao Tse-tung and General Vo Nguyen Giap on Guerrilla Warfare,” Military 
History Online, December 9, 2007, http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/ 
maotsetunggiap.aspx (accessed July 18, 2010).  
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For this plan to be feasible, the FARC concluded that it had to grow to 80 
fronts (with eight blocs of fronts) and have at least 32,000.36 To accomplish this, 
each front would have to grow by 200 men and 100 weapons each year. In 
addition, it designated the Colombian Eastern Mountain Range (Cordillera 
Oriental) as its Strategic Deployment Center because it believed that surrounding 
the capital city would paralyze the State. In order to achieve these objectives, the 
group estimated that it would need approximately $8,000,000,000 COP 
(Colombian Pesos), which equals about U.S. $50,000,000. 
2. Finances 
Up until this point, the FARC had used the extortion of wealthy companies 
as its primary means of financing. During the conference, however, the group 
recognized the need to increase its income and concluded that kidnapping would 
generate more income. They also became involved in the drug trade, by taxing 
the transactions made between the buyers and the growers (known as 
grammage tax), as well as providing protection to coca fields, laboratories, and 
illegal airstrips.  Within twelve years (1994), it controlled all aspects of this illegal 
business.37 
E.  INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS AND READJUSTMENTS 
In August 1982, Belisario Betancur became the Colombian President and 
immediately began a peace process with four guerrilla groups. The FARC 
accepted a truce with the government and even formed a legal political party in 
association with the Colombian Communist Party. 
1. Patriotic Union 
In 1985, members of the FARC and the Communist Party established the 
Patriotic Union (UP).  Following its founding, some of FARC’s commanders were 
elected to Congress, and the UP won a total of five seats in the Senate and nine 
                                            
36 The grouping of Fronts under a unified command. 
37 Pécault, Las FARC: Una Guerrilla sin fin o sin fines? 90. 
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in the House of Representatives. Three years later, it won mayoral elections in 
23 counties. Because the UP was associated with FARC, it became the target of 
political violence campaign of drug cartels, paramilitary forces, and rogue military 
agents. As a consequence, 2,000 of its members disappeared, and the party 
disbanded. 
2. Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia 
In 1989, the FARC held a Plenum38 and readjusted its strategic plan, 
calling it the Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia, which envisioned a 
campaign of four stages lasting over a period of six years beginning in 1990: 
• First Stage (1990 to 1992): The FARC set a goal of 60 fronts, 
18,000 armed men and resources of U.S. $56 million. Regional 
peace talks (with regional governments) were encouraged at this 
time as a way to weaken the central government. In addition, 
FARC’s leaders should be training abroad, and the creation of 
Bolivarian Militias in the cities was seen as imperative. 
• Second Stage (1992 to 1994): A goal of 80 fronts, 32,000 men and 
resources of U.S. $200 million was set. The group planned to 
initiate international relations at this time and procure more 
weapons, ships, aircrafts and communications equipment.  
• Third Stage (1994 to 1996): Deploy 16,000 men around Bogota in 
FARC’s Strategic Deployment Center and add 8,000 men to each 
side of the Eastern Mountain Ridge in order to exert pressure on 
Bogota. The group believed that the conditions that resulted from 
these deployments would cause a general strike in the country, 
which the FARC planned to take advantage of by instituting a 
provisional government, holding a plebiscite, and implementing new 
laws. 
• Fourth Stage: If for some reason the third stage were unsuccessful, 
the units would withdraw to favorable positions, break into more 
fronts, and launch another offensive, hoping that the use of 
indiscriminate terrorism would wear the Colombian Army down. 
 
                                            
38 Secondary decision instance. Comprised by Central General Staff members and 
Secretariat. Evaluates and adjusts the strategic plans. 
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It never launched the plan in the specified timeframe, but the FARC grew 
and became even stronger. 
F. A STRONG GUERRILLA 
1. Casa Verde 
In August 1990, Cesar Gaviria was elected as the new Colombian 
President, and in December of that same year, he launched an attack on Casa 
Verde, the FARC’s stronghold in the Uribe County (located in the State of Meta). 
The place had a historical meaning for the FARC; most of the EMC members 
had been stationed there for a long time. However, during the operation none of 
them were captured or killed. During years 1991 and 1992, the government tried 
to engage in peace talks with the FARC, first in Caracas and later in Tlaxcala, but 
both attempts failed. 
2. Eighth Conference 
At the end of March 1993, the FARC held a new conference that proved 
significant for its future. Not only did the group decide to create an international 
front in order to gain supporters abroad, but it also decided to consolidate its 
plans to create blocs of fronts. It also decided to focus on developing quality 
actions rather than focusing on the number of actions. In addition, the FARC 
proposed the discussion of an agenda of ten topics concerning the creation of a 
National Reconstruction and Reconciliation Government. 
3. International Front 
The FARC concluded that it was time to attract international attention. It 
set up an International Commission39 to present the FARC as Freedom Fighters. 
The commission served the following functions, among others: 
• Attract financial resources from organizations sympathetic to its 
cause.  
                                            
39 Adopted the name of International Front later on. 
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• Establish contacts in other countries to assure refuge from political 
persecution by the Colombian government. 
• Strengthen its logistical system by establishing contacts with 
international weapons traffickers. 
• Make the Colombian government appear responsible for human 
rights violations and as the sponsor of self-defense groups within 
the country. 
• Most importantly, seek international recognition (status of 
belligerency). 
One of the members of the Secretariat assumed the role of the 
international front commander, and in some cases, the front included injured or 
“retired” guerrillas. At this point, the FARC had a presence (representation) in 
Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Mexico, 
Panama, Nicaragua, Brazil, Spain, France, Denmark, Belgium, Switzerland, 
Australia and Canada amongst other countries.40 
4. Mobile Warfare 
The reorganization of FARC’s structures created six blocs of fronts and 
one joint command. This facilitated the ease of their actions. The FARC was now 
able to pull together several fronts in order to conduct quality actions against the 
Colombian Armed Forces. Beginning in 1994, the FARC showed their capacity to 
change tactics; it shifted from guerrilla to mobile warfare, especially in the 
southern and northwestern parts of Colombia. Some of their actions included, but 
were not limited to, the following: 
• August 30, 1996: Six Southern Bloc fronts collectively attacked an 
Army base located in “Las Delicias” in the State of Putumayo. After 
17 hours, the outpost surrendered. Thirty-one soldiers41 were killed, 
17 were injured, and 60 were kidnapped by the FARC.42 
                                            
40 Luis A. Villamarin P., Complot contra Colombia (Bogota: Ediciones Luis Alberto Villamarin 
Pulido, 2009), 48. 
41 The term “soldiers” is used regardless of the rank.  
42 “Golpes de Pecho,” Revista Semana, March 16, 2008, 
http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?IdArt=35493 (Accessed July 15, 2010). 
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• December 21, 1997: Around 300 guerrillas from different Southern 
Bloc fronts attacked an Army communications relay station located 
in Patascoy in the State of Nariño (established in an almost 
inaccessible mountain with extreme temperatures). After a 30-
minute engagement, the group killed 22 soldiers and kidnapped 
18.43 
• March 2, 1998: 400 guerrillas from the Southern Bloc attacked a 
small, newly formed Army counter-guerrilla battalion comprised of 
152 soldiers in El Billar, in the State of Caquetá. After 24 hours, 
they killed 65 soldiers killed and kidnapped 43.44 
• August 3, 1998: More than 500 men of the Eastern Bloc 
simultaneously attacked an Army Company and a National Police 
Counter-Narcotics Detachment (totaling 200 men) in Miraflores, in 
the State of Guaviare. After more than 30 hours of battle, the FARC 
killed 30 soldiers/policemen and kidnapped around 100.45  
• November 1, 1998: More than 1,500 men of the FARC’s Eastern 
Bloc seized Mitú, the capital city of the State of Vaupes (in the 
Amazon jungle). The city only had 120 police officers. Within 48 
hours, the FARC had killed 37 and kidnapped 61.46 
By the end of 1998, the FARC was close to achieving its objectives. It 
numbered around 12,000 men, the capacity of force concentration was huge, 
and it was skillful at using gas cylinders (two sizes: one as the grenade, the 
bigger as the launcher) as artisan mortars. At the same time, the Colombian 
Armed Forces47 were demoralized, and the new government had just approved a 
Demilitarized Zone in order to start, once again, peace talks with the hope of 
finally reaching a settlement.  
                                            
43 “Sangriento ataque de FARC a Patascoy,” El Tiempo, December 22, 1997, 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-717465 (Accessed July 15, 2010). 
44 “El Destacamento atacado preparaba golpe a Jojoy,” El Tiempo, March 6, 1998, 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-751456 (Accessed July 15, 2010). 
45 “Miraflores, eje de las FARC,” El Tiempo, March 6, 1998, http://www.eltiempo.com/ 
archivo/documento/MAM-816762 (Accessed July 15,2010). 
46 “Mitú fue el Infierno,” El Espectador, October 31, 2008, http://www.elespectador.com/ 
impreso/nacional/articuloimpreso87232-mitu-fue-el-infierno?page=0,0 (Accessed July 15, 2010). 
47 Armed Forces refers to Military Forces and the National Police. 
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Figure 3.   FARC units by the end of 1998 (From ESICI). 
G. DEMILITARIZED ZONE 
1. Peace Conversations 
In 1998, the overall security situation in Colombia was deteriorating very 
quickly; the FARC was demonstrating a new level of strength, and general chaos 
was now a real possibility. This was the setting for the next Presidential election. 
Andres Pastrana, one of the candidates, based his campaign on a proposed 
dialogue with the FARC. To do so, the FARC demanded the creation of a 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in order to create a political and territorial space to 
hold peace talks.48 Pastrana was elected President in August 1998 and in 
October 1998, the Colombian Congress authorized the establishment of a DMZ 
                                            
48 Even though the government spoke of “peace negotiations,” the FARC never used that 
term. Instead, the group referred to the process as “peace conversations.”  
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in the southern part of the country. The DMZ was comprised of five counties49 
and covered 42,000 square kilometers (i.e., it was larger than Switzerland). The 
peace conversations began on the wrong foot; the opening ceremony was on 
January 7, 1999, but even though Pastrana showed up, Marulanda never did.50  
 
Figure 4.   Demilitarized Zone (From ESICI). 
The Government desired to include in the conversation’s agenda topics 
such as a ceasefire, investment for social development, and the demobilization 
and reincorporation of the FARC into society. On the other hand, the FARC 
wanted to discuss a National Reconstruction Process (based on the 10 topics of 
the eighth Conference), government investment in the southern regions, and 






                                            
49 In the State of Meta: La Uribe, Vistahermosa, La Macarena and Mesetas. In the State of 
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguan. San Vicente was considered as the “capital city” of the DMZ. 
50 “Cronologia del Proceso de Paz,” BBC Mundo, February 21, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_1752000/1752115.stm (Accessed July 18, 2010). 
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FARC never included demobilization and reintegration in its agenda, but it did 
push hard for an “exchange of prisoners,”51 something to which the government 
never agreed.52  
Initially, the government established the DMZ for three months, but the 
FARC managed to have the time extended repeatedly. It used the DMZ as a 
rearguard area53 where it conducted training, replenished supplies, treated the 
sick and wounded, and gathered the numbers54 it needed to launch attacks on 
military and police units, villages, and the country’s energy and transportation 
infrastructure.  Coca crops existed in the five counties that composed the DMZ; 
the FARC took advantage of its control of the area and increased the size and 
quantity of the fields as well as its involvement in the business. The FARC not 
only taxed growers, but it also bought the coca paste to resell it. In some cases, it 
built the basic and HCL labs for producing coca paste and pure cocaine. It also 
controlled illegal airstrips in the zone, which in turn facilitated the transport of the 
coca paste outside the DMZ.55 As a result, the FARC became the new, and very 
well armed, drug cartel. 
At the same time, the government initiated a modernization and 
restructuration of its Armed Forces as well as putting into place an ambitious 
plan, known as Plan Colombia, to counter the narcotrafficking business around 
the country. 
                                            
51 The FARC wanted to include the exchange of soldiers and policemen for convicted 
guerrilla into the topics of the agenda as a way to achieve the status of belligerency.  
52 “El Golazo del Canje,” Revista Semana, February 15, 1999, http://www.semana.com/ 
noticias-nacion/golazo-del-canje/22897.aspx (Accessed July 18, 2010). 
53 “Juegos de Guerra,” Revista Semana, November 8, 1999, http://www.semana.com/ 
noticias-nacion/viento-coca/40253.aspx (Accessed July 19, 2010). 
54 It was estimated that the FARC had around 7,000 men at the DMZ. People kidnapped by 
the FARC often ended up in the DMZ. 
55 “Viento en Coca,” Revista Semana, November 8, 1999, http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/viento-coca/40253.aspx (Accessed July 19, 2010). 
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By the end of 2000, the FARC put together a column of about 400 men to 
retake the control of the Middle Magdalena region56 from the AUC57 in the 
northeastern part of Colombia. The Army discovered the group and destroyed 
most of it.58 Interestingly, this event marked the FARC’s return guerrilla warfare 
again. 
2. Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia 
The FARC took this opportunity to (once again) launch its ideological 
platform for a government of reconciliation and reconstruction. Named the 
“Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia,” its purpose was to gain political 
support before achieving power through the armed struggle.  At this time the 
FARC distanced itself from the PCC and decided to launch its own party, the 
Colombian Clandestine Communist Party (PCCC or PC3), in order to support its 
platform. It decided that the PC3 would be clandestine in order to avoid what 
happened to the UP at the end of the 1980s. Guillermo Leon Saenz Vargas, aka 
Alfonso Cano,59 organized the PC3. The Bolivarian Movement was a vehicle to 
bring together the armed component of the FARC and the Bolivarian militias. The 
proposed topics were as follows: 
• Finding a political solution to the country’s crisis 
• Allowing political power to rest in the workers 
• Following a scheme of national’s sovereignty defense 
• Embracing Simon Bolivar’s60 ideology (unification of Latin America) 
• Building a fourth power (moral power against corruption) 
• Having the state control the economy (no free markets) 
• Struggling against American Empire in defense of biodiversity 
                                            
56 A valley formed by the Magdalena river. 
57 AUC stands for Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, United Self-Defense Forces of 
Colombia; also included in the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. 
58 “Gaula entra en Operacion Berlin,” El Tiempo, December 26, 2000, 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1223868 (Accessed July 19, 2010). 
59 He is a member of the Secretariat and the Commander of the Caribbean Bloc. 
60 Simon Bolivar was the Liberator (Libertador) of Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador. 
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• Supporting agrarian reform against large estate and landowners  
• Creating a country without trade agreements imposed by empires 
• Developing as an underground movement 
This initiative, centered on the Bolivarian doctrine, allowed the FARC to 
move closer to the new-left tendencies and organizations in Latin America, such 
as the XXI Century Socialism, the Bolivarian Movement, the Sao Paulo Forum 
and the Continental Bolivarian Coordinator. By this, it sought to legitimize its 
armed struggle and achieve international recognition. 
3. Terrorist Group 
Not only did the FARC continue to stage attacks all over the country, but it 
also started to care less about the people living in the villages and small cities it 
attacked. The use of gas cylinders as mortars led to an increase in collateral 
damage. Another common FARC practice was to stop vehicles (cars, buses and 
trucks) and kidnap some of their occupants. These kidnappings not only served 
economic purposes, they also served as a way to exert pressure on the 
government, especially through the kidnapping of politicians. On July 15, 2001, 
for example, the FARC kidnapped Alan Jara, a former Governor of the State of 
Meta. He was acting as a UN consultant and the FARC intercepted him as he 
was traveling from Lejanias (county of the State of Meta) to Villavicencio even 
though he was riding in a UN vehicle. The FARC pulled him out of it by force.61 
Later, on September 29, 2001, the FARC kidnapped and assassinated Consuelo 
Araujo, a former Minister of Culture.62 Not too long afterward, on November 2, 
2001, the U.S. Department of State added the FARC to the list of Foreign 
                                            
61 “Alan Jara, un Desafio a la Neutralidad,” Revista Semana, January 26, 2009, 
http://www.semana.com/noticias-conflicto-armado/alan-jara-desafio-neutralidad/119965.aspx 
(Accessed July 19, 2010). 
62 “Hallado el cadaver de la Ex Ministra de Cultura secuestrada el Lunes pasado por las 
FARC,” El Mundo, October 01, 2001, http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2001/09/30/internacional/ 
1001858025.html (Accessed July 19, 2010). 
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Terrorist Organizations,63 in accordance with the definition of terrorist action by 
INA, Act 212.64 The European Union followed suit on June 17, 2002.65  
4. The End of the Peace Conversations and the DMZ 
The government became concerned about the increase in kidnapping by 
the FARC and allegations that the FARC was exercising total authority in the 
DMZ. After signing the agreement of San Francisco de la Sombra,66 the 
government extended the FARC’s access to the DMZ until February 20, 2002, 
but it also announced its intentions to exert more control over the area. The 
FARC did not like this and suspended negotiations until the following year. On 
January 3rd, the talks resumed. After ten days without an agreement, President 
Pastrana set a January 14th deadline and threatened to send the Army into the 
DMZ. Each side blamed the other for the lack of agreement. The President 
extended the deadline until January 20th, and the conversations continued. On 
January 20th, both sides agreed to start working on a timetable for a cease-fire 
starting on April 7th, although the attacks, kidnappings and killings continued. On 
February 20th, the FARC hijacked a commercial airplane and kidnapped a 
Senator. President Pastrana declared the end of the DMZ and ordered the 
Armed Forces to occupy it after midnight the same day. By this time, the FARC 
had around 17,000 armed men.67 On February 23, 2002, Ingrid Betancourt, a 
presidential candidate, insisted on travelling to San Vicente del Caguan, to 
                                            
63 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations,” August 6, 2010, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 
(Accessed August 11, 2010). 
64 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “INA: 
Act 212-General Classes of Aliens Ineligible to Receive Visas and Ineligible for Admission; 
Waivers of Inadmissibility,” http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.f6da51a2342135be7 
e9d7a10e0dc91a0/?vgnextoid=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchan
nel=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&CH=act (Accessed August 11, 2010). 
65 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Republica de Colombia, Documentos, 
http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/portal/Mindefensa (Accessed August 11, 2010). 
66 Among other topics, the main effort was directed towards an immediate commencement 
of cease-fire dialogs. 
67 International Crisis Group, “Colombia’s Elusive Quest for Peace,” March 22, 2002, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/001-colombias-
elusive-quest-for-peace.aspx (Accessed July 20, 2010), 10, 34–40.  
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address the population. Despite the advice and warnings from the Army and 
National Police, she went ahead and the FARC kidnapped her before she 
reached San Vicente.68 
 
Figure 5.   FARC’s size by mid 200269 (From ESICI). 
                                            
68 “Asi fue el Secuestro de Ingrid Betancourt,” El Espectador, April 3, 2008, 
http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/articulo-asi-fue-el-secuestro-de-ingrid-betancourt 
(Accessed July 20, 2010). 
69 In this map the actual FARC’s Fronts are not shown, instead, its base areas are shown. 
 29
H. DEMOCRATIC SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY 
1. New President – New Policy 
After the end of the DMZ peace talks, a general feeling of disappointment 
pervaded Colombia; most citizens felt betrayed by the FARC. That same year, 
the country held new presidential elections, and a candidate, Alvaro Uribe, who 
had been a Senator and the Governor of the State of Antioquia but was not 
widely known, came into play.  He proposed to implement the Democratic 
Security and Defense Policy, which stated that it was necessary to “establish and 
reinstate the rule of law in Colombia and protect the population.”70 Uribe won the 
election, and he put his proposed policies into place. The modernization and 
transformation process of the Armed Forces continued; the Army grew in its 
number of units and effectiveness in order to regain the territory lost to the 
FARC. Most of the units secured the roads, protected the energy infrastructure, 
and closed down the FARC’s mobility corridors between Colombian States. The 
major military effort began in the State of Cundinamarca (where Bogota is 
located) and in the southeastern part of Colombia. 
2. Major Setback – Operation Liberty I 
The FARC managed to surround the capital city with numerous fronts, and 
the destruction of these fronts became a priority for the Colombian government. 
The operation began in June 2003, and by November, the Colombian 
government had dismantled the fronts and killed the main fronts’ commanders. 
FARC casualties included “Marco Aurelio Buendia,” a legendary FARC leader 
who led the attempt to siege Bogota.71 With this operation, the FARC suffered a 
major setback in its quest to take over the reins of the country by the force. 
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3. Patriot Plan 
This military plan aimed to recover the territory gained by FARC during the 
establishment of the DMZ. A Joint Task Force (division strength) was formed to 
accomplish this goal. As the government recovered the DMZ territory, the FARC 
retreated to areas deep inside the Colombian jungles. The population increased 
its support of and collaboration with the military, especially in terms of 
information. On December 2004, Ricardo Gonzalez, aka Rodrigo Granda, was 
captured in Venezuela and turned over to Colombian authorities at the 
international border. The FARC considered Granda its “Foreign Minister,” and he 
represented the group at a Bolivarian Congress held in Caracas.72 By 2004, 
Army Intelligence estimated the FARC’s numbers around 12,000 men.  
4. Policy for the Consolidation of the Democratic Security 
President Uribe was elected for a second term, and a revision of the policy 
was necessary. Although the government had managed to reduce the size of the 
FARC, the group adjusted its tactics, so Uribe recognized that more action from 
the state was required. The Army gained territorial control throughout the 
country, and the government reintroduced every type of government service into 
these areas.73 In addition, the FARC began to lose more members to 
demobilization than to armed engagements with the Army and National Police.  
The FARC had a strong presence in the northwestern part of Colombia, in 
particular in the area known as Montes de Maria. The Front Commander of that 
area, Martin Caballero, was something of a legend within the FARC, but pressure 
from the Armed Forces diminished his front. During a military operation on 
December 31, 2006, the former Ministry of Development, Fernando Araujo, who 
the FARC had kidnapped six years before, escaped. In the Pacific region, 
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because of the paranoia caused by the pressure of military operations, two 
FARC fronts engaged in “friendly fire,” killing eleven deputies of the State of Valle 
del Cauca’s Assembly, who had been kidnapped in 2002.   
For years, the Colombian Armed Forces had been never able to kill or 
capture relevant FARC front commanders, much less members of the 
Secretariat, but with the change of policy, that became possible.  For example, 
Front 16 of the FARC was tasked with the narcotrafficking business in the south 
of Colombia. It also provided money, weapons and explosives for the group.74 Its 
commander, Tomas Medina Caracas, aka Negro Acacio, had contacts with all 
kinds of international drug traffickers and weapons suppliers. However, a 
September 2007 Air Force bombing run, which was based on good intelligence, 
killed him. With his death, Front 16 began to collapse. It went from 50 HCL75 labs 
to only two, losing more than U.S. $300 million.76 
In October 2007, the Armed Forces killed another iconic front commander, 
Gustavo Rueda Diaz, aka Martin Caballero, Commander of Front 35. This Front 
controlled the Montes de Maria area. After his death, this Front practically 
disappeared, and the FARC lost all control over the territory. 
The FARC, in another strange episode, summoned an international 
committee to release Emmanuel, the son of hostage Clara Rojas, who was born 
in captivity. On December 31, the FARC and President Chávez accused 
President Uribe of failing to provide guarantees for the boy’s liberation. However, 
Uribe, in a later press conference, announced that the FARC had lost track the 
boy years ago, and he was now safely in Bogota in the government’s custody.77 
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I. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 
1. Unilateral Liberations and Lack of Support in Colombia 
In an effort to get back on track, the FARC released two political hostages 
on January 10, 2008. It handed them to a Venezuelan committee in the 
Colombian jungles. The hostages flew to Venezuela, where President Chávez 
received them. The next day, during his annual state of the nation address to the 
National Assembly, President Chávez, asked the Colombian President, the 
governments of the Continent and Europe, to remove the FARC from world’s 
terrorist list and give the group recognition (status of belligerency).78  
At the beginning of February, over 13 million people in more than 185 
cities around the world participated in rallies against the FARC.79  On February 
25, the Colombian National Police captured Heli Mejia Mendoza, aka Martin 
Sombra, who was one of the FARC’s founding members.  They found a permit in 
his possession issued by the Venezuelan Office of Migration that enabled him to 
travel and move freely around the city of Machiques in the State of Zulia.  As a 
gesture of thanks for President Chávez support and understanding, the FARC 
released four more hostages to a Venezuelan committee. 
2. The Fall of the Myth 
March 2008 was a bad month for the FARC. On March 1, a joint operation 
involving the Colombian Air Force, Army, and National Police killed Luis Edgar 
Devia Silva, aka Raul Reyes,80 in his camp located 1,800 meters inside Ecuador. 
It was the first death of a member of the Secretariat, and it destroyed the myth 
that members of the Secretariat were untouchable. During the raid, three 
computers and some USB memory cards were recovered, which contained more 
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than 600 GB of documents, including the exchange of e-mails and documents 
among members of the Central General Staff about FARC’s national and 
international situation. It proved to be a gold mine for the Colombian 
Government.81  
Demoralization among the FARC became so deep after the death of 
Reyes that on March 3rd it lost another member of its Secretariat, killed by his 
own bodyguard.  Manuel Muñoz Ortiz, aka Ivan Rios, was the Commander of the 
Northwestern Bloc and the youngest member of the Secretariat. His bodyguard, 
aka Rojas, killed him during a simulated engagement with the army.  Rojas cut 
off his hand as evidence and turned himself into the Army. 
Finally, on March 26 Pedro Antonio Marin, aka Manuel Marulanda or 
Tirofijo, died in the middle of the jungle. Some information states that he died 
from injuries suffered after a bombing run from the Air Force; others claim that he 
died of a heart attack. Regardless, his death threatened the cohesiveness of the 
group. The Colombian Ministry of Defense made the announcement in May, 
which forced the FARC to issue a communiqué confirming his death, and 
designating Alfonso Cano as the new FARC Commander. Timochenko delivered 
this communiqué82 from his camp, well inside Venezuela.83  
3. Reyes’s Computers 
Almost as important as the death of Reyes was the seizure of his 
computers, which not only provided knowledge of the FARC’s internal situation 
but also of its most relevant international contacts. To certify the validity of the 
computers, an Interpol forensic team examined them and determined that the 
Colombian authorities had not tampered with them. When information contained 
on the computers became public, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua attempted 
to discredit the information by claiming it was a masquerade on the part of the 
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Colombian government. This reaction was undoubtedly prompted by the 
revelation that strong ties existed between these three governments and the 
FARC, ties that they denied.84  
4. Big Blows 
The main purpose of the FARC’s political hostages was to exert pressure 
on the government in order to get the approval of a permanent law to exchange 
military personnel and politicians for imprisoned guerrillas.85 The most important 
hostages for the FARC were the former presidential candidate, Ingrid 
Betancourt86 and three American citizens, whom they kidnapped in 2003.  
In July, after tapping FARC’s communications for months, the Army 
instigated a deceptive operation (Operation Jaque), which resulted in the rescue 
of 15 hostages, including Betancourt and the three Americans. The FARC not 
only lost its most valuable assets, but also its capacity to maintain command and 
control without discovery by the Armed Forces.87  
In October, a guerrilla (who had been with the FARC for 12 years), tasked 
with the security of a politician kidnapped eight years earlier, decided to run away 
and turn himself in, taking the hostage with him. After a couple of days, he 
located the Army and eventually received a monetary reward. He is now 
living in France with his partner. He escaped from the FARC because it seemed 
the only feasible option to avoid death and because he was tired of the armed 
struggle.88 
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Another important hostage held by the FARC was Luis Mendieta, a police 
officer kidnapped during the assault on Mitú in 1998. During his captivity, he was 
promoted to Brigadier General, becoming the highest-ranking officer held captive 
by the FARC. An operation executed in July 2010 rescued the General, two more 
police officers and an Army NCO from the camp where the FARC had them. An 
unconfirmed report stated that the Secretariat ordered the execution of the 
guerrillas responsible for holding them. This demoralized the group even more.89 
5.  Mono Jojoy is Dead 
In September 23, 2010, the Colombian Armed Forces launched a joint 
operation called “Sodoma” in the jungles of the State of Meta. This operation led 
to the death of the FARC’s second in command, Victor Julio Suarez Rojas, aka 
Mono Jojoy or Jorge Briceño. The FARC’s military commander, he was one of its 
most ruthless. At the time of his death, he was hiding in a concrete reinforced 
bunker90 where 18 laptops and 67 USB drives containing information on the 
terrorist group were also found. In the same camp, the army found 30 tons of 
groceries, 120 mortar rounds, and more than 13,000 rifle cartridges.91 
Unquestionably, this was the most successful operation against the FARC to 
date. Not only did it eliminate a member of the Secretariat, but it also meant the 
loss of an iconic FARC figure, which should lead to additional demoralization 
within the FARC’s ranks.  
J. CURRENT SITUATION 
The FARC is still far from being defeated, but its current situation is 
anything but favorable. The numbers of guerrillas killed in operations have 
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diminished, but the number of guerrillas who have been demobilized has grown 
exponentially, especially among those who have been in the FARC between five 
to ten years.  Recent estimates set the FARC’s numbers at around 7,000, with 
the corresponding loss of territorial control.92 The number of active fronts has 
fallen by more than 50% as well. 
 
Figure 6.   FARC’s size, presence and influence in 2010 (From ESICI). 
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It is also clear that the FARC has lost the battle for the minds and hearts 
of the Colombian population.93 It has failed completely in the political aspect of its 
revolutionary struggle. In a country of 44 million inhabitants, less than 3% 
approve or support the FARC. The FARC has not been able to attract mass 
support for its project, even, remarkably, within the three possible groups: 
voluntaries, forced, and neutrals (passive supporters).94    
On the military side, the death of four members of the Secretariat has 
been a big loss for the FARC, which sees its new Commander as an ideologist 
without the proper military experience. Lately, the FARC has lost many 
experienced mid-level commanders, which in turn has degraded its operational 
capability and cohesiveness.  Armed Forces pressure and their ability to intercept 
FARC’s communications have rapidly deteriorated the FARC’s exercise of 
command and control, and subsequently, its military actions. 
Increased security throughout the country has also significantly reduced 
opportunities for kidnapping and extortion, which has seriously affected the 
FARC’s finances. Since the security agencies have also established greater 
territorial control, the FARC has lost influence in zones with coca activity, 
damaging its finances even more.95  
In the international arena, after a very complicated period when the 
diplomatic relations with Venezuela were frozen, President Chávez recently 
stated that an armed struggle is not the solution to the social conflict, and, on a 
few occasions, has called upon the FARC to cease its use of violence.96 Ecuador 
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has been distancing itself from the FARC and has been more receptive to 
collaboration with the Colombian government whenever the FARC cross the 
border.97 In a recent communiqué from the FARC, the group asked for an 
opportunity to discuss the Colombian conflict in the Union of South American 
States (UNASUR), but not a single country approved the request.98 
Nevertheless, according to the documents found in Raul Reyes’s laptops, the 
FARC has more international contacts than was previously believed. Only time 
will tell if President Chávez’s change in posture towards FARC is genuine or not.  
K. CONCLUSION 
The FARC’s growth rate during the 1990s was impressive, but its numbers 
have dropped dramatically since that time. Even though it had a well-structured 
plan to overthrow the government, it was not able to carry it out. Moreover, the 
actions and methods it employed in its search for power generated little support 
from the Colombian population. Nevertheless, it has yet to be defeated and still 
possesses the military capability to threaten some rural areas in Colombia. We 
now turn into an analysis of the group as a social movement. 
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IV. THE FARC AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Even though the FARC was, at its zenith in the late 1990s, one of the 
largest and oldest guerrilla groups in the world, its current situation has changed 
significantly over the years. Its main objective to seize the political power is 
Colombia is impossible. The FARC has taken steps that have prevented the 
group from achieving its main objective. However, it is important to note that the 
group still possesses a significant military capacity as well as sources of 
financing that allow them remain active.99 This chapter draws on the Political 
Process Model in order to understand the conditions that were present in the 
Colombian society that allowed the FARC to be born, grow and consolidate as a 
strong movement against the government. 
B. EXPANSION OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Political Instability – La Violencia 
In 1948, the political situation in Colombia was poor. Many disagreements 
existed between the two political parties. The assassination of Jorge Eliecer 
Gaitan, who the public saw as a progressive and charismatic figure who would 
end social inequalities, created turmoil that led to the emergence of guerrilla 
groups from both political parties that fought against each other. The Communist 
party took advantage of the situation and endorsed its own guerillas.100 All were 
trying to kill each other over different ideologies. In some cases, political leaders 
hired “death squads” for this purpose. It was very common to see a family, with 
different political ideas, slaughtered on their own ranch. When this happened, 
some influential figures took advantage of the situation to reclaim lands as their 
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own, often stealing them from the owners through forced displacement. Because 
they supported agrarian reform, the communist guerrillas slowly gained 
acceptance from the population. 
The government offered an amnesty program for the guerrillas, but since it 
did not address the land problem, the “agrarian self-defense groups” did not 
come in from the cold.  Their main purpose was to protect the peasants from the 
big landowners who arose during this period and to bring about a change in 
government. In some cases, the excesses by the army against the guerrillas, and 
sometimes toward civilians, led more people to seek the protection of the 
communist groups and join them. 
In 1964, the army attacked one of the self-defense strongholds, 
Marquetalia. The groups disbanded and their leaders realized that they needed 
to join forces in order to take effective action against the government. With the 
objectives to change the government, implement land reform, modify the system 
in order to bring forth social equality and embrace an anti imperialism posture, 
the Southern Bloc, later known as the FARC, was born.101 During these initial 
years, the FARC gained many supporters and achieved recognition for its 
proposed agrarian reform. 
2. Enhanced Political Positions – Patriotic Union 
After some years of trying different approaches (small initiatives) to 
achieve a peace in Colombia, the government proposed a truce with the FARC in 
1984. Marulanda agreed and even committed to cease kidnappings. People 
viewed this gesture with hope for a new period. In 1985, the FARC saw the truce 
as an opportunity to expand its political position and created, in conjunction with 
the Communist Party, its own political party, the Patriotic Union (UP). Some 
FARC commanders held positions of responsibility in the new party, and in the 
Congressional elections of 1986, the party earned 5 seats in the Senate and 9 in 
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the House of Representatives.102 However, the real achievement was the 
presence of supporters outside the Communist Party. In the 1988 municipalities’ 
elections, the UP gained 23 seats for mayors around the country. In some 
villages, the FARC was able to co-govern through the mayors and assemblies 
sympathetic to the group; in others, they governed through intimidation.103 Thus 
for a time, the FARC was able to expand its political power. However, in 1987, 
the truce ended, and for the next three years, unlawful elements of society began 
an extermination campaign of UP members. At the end of 1990, with a great 
number of its members assassinated, the FARC’s cadre returned underground.  
Not only did the FARC take this opportunity to explore the political field, 
but it also created urban militias. Since the group never honored its commitment 
to cease kidnappings and continued to assassinate regional leaders, many of the 
UP’s militants ended their association with the armed struggle.104 The general 
environment of this period allowed the FARC to gain some supporters in the form 
of militias, but it lost a unique opportunity to gain political influence.      
3. Ideological Openness 
Ideological openness toward the FARC never existed in Colombian 
society. There was never a period of time when extensive and radical social 
change found acceptance among Colombians. In fact, the majority of the 
population was indifferent to the general situation, and when people did get 
involved, it was to voice a lack of support. The FARC has maintained its very 
small group of hardcore supporters, but the forced supporters and the passive 
supporters have changed over time.105 The former has been reduced by the 
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increased state presence in territories influenced by the FARC, and the latter has 
decreased because of their disapproval of the means used to generate the social 
change. 
C. INCREASE IN ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES 
Any social group needs a variety of resources to guarantee its survival 
and to grow; in some cases, the FARC’s methods have played against the group. 
1. Education of Members 
Most members of the FARC only have an elementary education; however, 
one of its founders, Jacobo Arenas, came from the Communist Party with a very 
clear idea about the theses of Marx and Lenin. He took upon himself the task of 
indoctrinating the FARC. He developed, along with others such as Marulanda, 
the FARC’s ideology. As a rural movement comprised mostly of peasants, the 
FARC’s leadership was reluctant to accept highly educated people into its 
ranks.106 However, the leadership understood the utility of “intellectuals” to 
promote and refine its own ideology and to have more groups from which to 
recruit. This is how Guillermo Leon Saenz, a former anthropology student, 
became the FARC’s top ideologist after Jacobo Arenas died, and then assumed 
full leadership of the group, after the death of Marulanda.    
2. Financial Resources – Self Financing 
When the FARC began, it only had rudimentary weapons that had 
belonged to its founding members. Over time through a series of ambushes, the 
group was able to procure better weapons from the army. It survived with help 
from supporters in rural areas. Eventually, the leadership realized that to grow 
they needed better forms of financing. They began kidnapping wealthy 
individuals and extorting enterprises but eventually it did not distinguish whom it 
kidnapped. In addition, once the FARC recognized the huge potential of the drug 
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business, it got involved. Initially, it just taxed transactions between growers and 
buyers, but eventually it planted its own coca fields, as well as creating the 
means to produce and sell it. This practice provided the FARC with its biggest 
source of revenue, which in the 2003 was around U.S. $1.5 billion.107   
3. Organizations to Recruit From 
During its existence, the FARC has mainly recruited from the peasant 
population using a variety of methods. In some cases, mostly during its early 
years, the FARC appealed to low-educated peasants by giving them a gun, 
paying them a basic salary, and providing them with their basic needs, stressing 
that being a member of the FARC was a better livelihood than hard agricultural 
work. It also promised them a better future once the seizure of power was 
completed. This method actually worked; many people were convinced to joining 
the FARC.108 
The FARC also became aware of the left-wing tendencies of a couple of 
Colombian universities. After welcoming a few “intellectuals” from these 
institutions, the FARC recognized the potential of recruiting members from urban 
educational institutions in order to form the urban militias it hoped would play a 
vital role during the final stages of its strategic plan. This initiative met with limited 
success.  
One of its main recruiting efforts targeted people living in the poor outskirts 
of the main cities. It has been trying to seduce this sector of the population into 
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However, due to the decreasing numbers of FARC’s combatants and its current 
lack of popular support, the group has turned more to forced recruitment,109 
especially of minors.110       
4. Free Spaces 
Since its beginnings, the FARC has had strongholds in the jungle. With 
the development of the “Bolivarian Militias” in the urban areas, the group 
established safe houses in some cities. However, due to the pressure of the 
military, rural commanders rarely ventured to urban areas. Moreover, in the 90’s 
the FARC held territorial influence in over 40% of the country and had 
strongholds that the military was not able to reach. It was the perfect environment 
for the group. It created many rearguard areas that guaranteed its survival.111 
The main event that allowed the FARC to grow was the time that it controlled the 
DMZ. Its members were able to walk freely in those counties because not even 
the National Police was allowed there. For all practical purposes, the FARC 
“owned” that land for almost four years.    
5. Indigenous Groups – Peasants  
The peasants were the strongest indigenous group from which the FARC 
recruited its members and leadership and developed solidary incentives and 
communication networks. The FARC started as an agrarian self-defense 
movement, and to some extent, they have remained so. Most of its members 
belong to that group, as do the majority of its top leadership. There are some 
exceptions, where the FARC has been trying to recruit from Universities, but it 
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has not proven very successful. Even now, the FARC’s top commander, who 
most consider an “intellectual,”  does not have strong acceptance because of his 
“lack” of military background.112 
D. DEVELOPMENT OF INSURGENT CONSCIOUSNESS 
The main grievances that led to the rise of the FARC were the desire for 
land reform and the social inequalities present in the Colombian society. During 
the first years of La Violencia, most of the members of the self-defense agrarian 
groups only wanted their farms back. Marulanda used to say, “All that I want is 
my farm back as well as my pigs and my chickens.”113 
The Communist Party saw a big opportunity to use these groups to 
vindicate the social struggle or social revolution that was carried out in other 
countries. Using the Marxist-Leninist ideology as a vehicle, the groups were 
convinced that not only were the reforms that they wanted possible, but also the 
seizure of the government was necessary in order to establish a “free and just” 
system. When the ideology was far more developed, leaders told the cadre that 
the struggle was also against United States for its imperialistic posture towards 
America and to recover the riches from natural resources they had stolen. 
After the fall of the Berlin wall, the FARC developed an improved political 
project to attract more supporters. It launched the Bolivarian Campaign for a New 
Colombia, which sought to establish an underground political party to attract 
more supporters. Its platform found inspiration from a combination of the 
Bolivarian (unification of Latin America) and Marxist-Leninist ideologies.114 The 
FARC claimed the only solution to the country’s crisis was the adoption of a new 
political system in which political power should rest with the workers. The FARC 
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argued that the system should be based on a scheme of national sovereignty 
defense and the institution of a fourth popular power (moral power against the 
system’s corruption). The state should control the economy (no free markets) 
and institute land reform. It should also resist the American empire in defense of 
biodiversity, without imposed trade agreements.115 Like Venezuela, Colombia 
holds the Liberator, Simon Bolivar, in a special place, and the FARC has used 
his name and ideas to frame the purpose of its armed struggle. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Although the factors for the rise of a social movement were present in 
Colombia and the FARC took advantage of unique political opportunities to 
increase its influence, current reality is completely different. 
The FARC has lost its main asset: popular support. It does not matter how 
much money it can gather to finance its political project; the people of Colombia 
do not want it. On February 4, 2008, the biggest rally against any cause in the 
world’s history took place in Colombia and in 155 cities around the world. It was a 
rally against the FARC.116 It shows how big its lack of public support is. 
The FARC has also abandoned its guiding ideology. Ever since the 1990s, 
the group has immersed itself in the drug business.  The leadership cares more 
about the money produced by cocaine, than the seizure of power necessary to 
produce their desired social transformation through a Marxist-Leninist-Bolivarian 
government. However, it is important to note that in an effort to attract more 
sympathizers, the FARC embraced Bolivarianism, attempting to appeal to the 
nationalism of the Colombians and its neighboring countries. Indeed, the next 
chapter presents the evolution of the Venezuelan Bolivarian Revolution in order 
to understand why both movements appeal to each other.  
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V. VENEZUELA’S TRANSFORMATION PROCESS: FROM 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY TO DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on Venezuela’s transition from a much-celebrated 
“liberal democracy” that set it apart from many other countries in Latin America, 
to its current position as “democratic socialist” state that seeks to not only 
transform Venezuela, but also spearhead a “Bolivarian” alternative to liberal 
democracy and capitalism. It first looks at the conditions of Venezuelan society 
during the 1980s and 90s that helped facilitate Hugo Chávez’ rise to power. Then 
it will turn to a brief history of the Bolivarian Revolutions’ birth and its 
implementation in Venezuela. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Although Venezuela has had periods of dictatorships, many consider the 
country one of the oldest and most stables democracies in Latin America.  
Moreover, many political scientists refer to its history as the “Venezuelan 
exceptionalism thesis.”117 The thesis establishes that, throughout its history the 
country has not had internal struggles, keen class conflicts, or racial issues like 
other countries in Latin America.118 For many years, political analysts presented 
the exceptionalism view by labeling Venezuela a model democracy due to its 
stability, marginalization of the left, and avoidance of militant independent trade 
unions.119 In the second half of the twentieth century, after overthrowing a 
military dictator, the existing political parties subscribed an agreement for sharing 
power in the country; it was called the Punto Fijo Pact. Essentially, it allowed the 
parties to alternate power and design alliances and coalitions in order to govern 
the country. It also permitted the parties to incorporate smaller parties into their 
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own structure. It was much praised, and Venezuela enjoyed a period of stability 
and sustained development. It created the ability to overcome the guerrilla 
violence of the sixties. During the seventies, the world considered Venezuela 
another Saudi Arabia because of its enormous oil deposits. However, far from 
satisfying social demands, and due to the economic measures adopted at that 
time, clientelism and corruption arose, which led to a growing popular 
dissatisfaction.120 In February 1989, the government issued a package of 
economic adjustments, which led to riots in different cities around Venezuela, 
including Caracas. In just few hours, rioter sacked and looted the capital city. 
After the intervention of the army and a curfew the following day, the situation 
was under control, but the death toll was in the hundreds. The incident, known as 
El Caracazo, served to demonstrate the unrest of the people with the current 
government and its policies.121 In other words, the conditions for the emergence 
of social movements seeking transformation of the country were present in the 
Venezuelan society at that time. More importantly, the social movement 
(Bolivarian Revolution) was already created and almost completely organized to 
take action.  
C. MBR-200 – REVOLUTIONARY BOLIVARIAN MOVEMENT – 200 
1. Born and Shape of the Revolution 
Hugo Chávez Frías is the founder of the Revolutionary Bolivarian 
Movement – 200. During his childhood, his influences included members of the 
Communist Party in Barinas, especially Jose Esteban Ruiz Guevara. Chávez 
read Marx and Mao and learned the basic ideas about capitalism, communism, 
and revolution. His heroes at that time included Simón Bolívar, Ezequiel Zamora, 
Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara. Ruiz was fundamental for linking the nationalism 
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of Bolivar and Zamora to the communism of Castro and Guevara.122 Chávez 
attended the military academy and graduated as a Second Lieutenant in 1975. In 
his years at the academy, he tried to create an activist group called the “Army for 
the Liberation of the Venezuelan People”; however, it did not attract great 
support and disappeared. 
In the years that followed, he continued to discuss his ideas of revolution 
with his closest friends. In December 1982, he and three of his closest friends 
repeated Bolívar’s oath against Spanish rule made in 1805 and created the 
MBR-200.123 This was their way to honor the birth of the Liberator Simón Bolívar. 
Chávez explained the purpose of this movement in a speech in Havana in 1994: 
“We had the audacity to found a movement within the ranks of the Army of 
Venezuela. We were tired of the corruption, and we swore to dedicate our lives to 
the creation of a revolutionary movement and to the revolutionary struggle in 
Venezuela, straight away, within Latin America.”124 
Chávez started to live a double life. By day, he was a military officer, but 
night, he was a revolutionary giving shape to the revolutionary process. Over 
countless nights, he incorporated more military officers and prominent civilians 
such as Douglas Bravo125 into his movement.  He also recruited others who 
would help him later in the revolutionary process. 
The popular uprising known as El Caracazo served to confirm to Chávez 
that the conditions for a change of regime were in place, and it was time to take 
action.126  
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2. Coup d’état 
On February 4, 1992, Chávez instructed his comrades in arms to launch 
military operations in key regions of Venezuela in order to take over the 
government and overthrow president Carlos Andres Pérez. The coup, postponed 
over the years for lack of support, was a failure, and Chávez had to surrender. 
The only condition of surrender he made was to address his men on national 
television, so he could order them to surrender. That opportunity was given to 
him. When he was about to address the nation, he was asked to submit his 
written statement. He refused, but the government still allowed him to speak on 
air. He saluted the people of Venezuela using Bolívar as a reference and stated 
that for now they had not accomplished their movement’s objectives. He asked 
his comrades to lay down their weapons and assumed full responsibility for the 
Bolivarian military movement.127 It is important to note that the civilian members 
of the group were never involved in the coup attempt.   
3. Imprisonment 
Chávez and his comrades were sent to prison. He was not charged with 
any crime, and the subsequent polls showed that 62 percent of Venezuelans 
supported the coup. Chávez was seen as a hope for the poorest poor; even 
former president Rafael Caldera said that he understood Chávez, that a hungry 
people would not defend democracy.128 The whole episode served Chávez’s 
purpose and provided him with a popularity that he could otherwise never have 
reached. He became a hero of the Venezuelan people. 
That year a series of events took place that helped consolidate the image 
of Chávez as a savior. In May, president Pérez faced charges of embezzlement. 
Supposedly, he used a secret fund (around U.S. $2 million) to pay for the 
protection of Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro. The subsequent trial led to 
the president’s dismissal and in the streets the people shouted, “Chávez was 
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right.” 129 Congress nominated a temporary president and planned for new 
elections at the end of the year. In November, Venezuela faced another failed 
coup attempt. Former president Rafael Caldera won the new election and took 
office in 1994. 
4. Political Opportunities 
One of Caldera’s first official acts was to grant amnesty to Chávez and his 
comrades. The Chávez case was dismissed, which allowed Chávez to participate 
in politics. In December that same year, Chávez traveled to Cuba for his first 
meeting with Fidel Castro. 
Caldera won on an anti-neoliberal platform, but throughout his presidential 
term, primarily because of pressure brought on by a banking crisis, he adopted 
neoliberal policies and reforms, including the privatization of many state 
companies and industries, including (partially) the oil industry.130 Consequently, 
the state company, Venezuelan Petroleum (PDVSA), started to follow its own 
agenda. It was becoming more of a transnational corporation, which reduced the 
state’s capacity to regulate its activity and share in its earnings,131 which led to 
the withdrawal of governmental subsidies for basic food, such as milk, pasta, 
meat and fuel. These policies accentuated exclusion and inequality in Venezuela, 
which opened the door for a new candidate with a new and completely different 
political perspective.132 
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D. MVR – FIFTH REPUBLIC MOVEMENT 
1. Presidential Elections 
When Chávez got out of prison, he traveled around the country in order to 
convince people to refrain from voting in the upcoming local elections; however, 
he eventually came to see that this was not the best strategy. By 1996, most of 
the population had lost confidence in the traditional parties; inflation, 
unemployment, insecurity and the poor quality of public services were a major 
concern amongst Venezuelans.133 At that time, Luis Miquilena, an old 
communist, advised Chávez to utilize the democratic process. Chávez 
reconstituted his movement, changing its name to the Fifth Republic Movement 
(MVR)134 and transforming it into a political party. In 1998, after conducting an 
exhaustive grassroots campaign against his rivals, Chávez was elected president 
of Venezuela.135  
2. Initial Referendum – New Constitution 
In his initial speech, Chavez confirmed his intention to call for a 
referendum in order to convene a Constituent Assembly. Although he faced huge 
opposition from the Congress and Supreme Court of Justice, he called the 
referendum by decree. Three months later, the people approved it with 80% of 
the vote. Members of the MVR comprised 95% of the members of the 
Assembly.136 They wrote a new Constitution and held new elections for the 
Presidency, Congress, and local positions in the states. Venezuela became the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chávez was reelected and the new 
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elections helped him to eliminate any opposition that he had faced in the old 
Congress and in the states. Almost all of the government and its institutions were 
sympathetic to his policies. 
The new constitution included guidelines for restructuring the judiciary, 
achieving political democracy through direct participation, increasing the 
branches of power to five, and incorporating Citizen Power and Electoral Power. 
It also granted the military the right to vote, and took involvement in military 
promotions away from the National Assembly (formerly Congress and now 
unicameral). It also gave the president the power to legislate directly on any 
matter (called “ley habilitante” or enabling law). Furthermore, the new constitution 
eliminated the public financing of political parties, and allowed for excessive state 
intervention in the social aspects of the country (housing, education, health, etc.).  
For all practical purposes, the result was an increased concentration of power in 
the president.137 
The country also started to play a more active role in OPEC, complying 
with its strict quotas. This increased the price of the oil internationally and 
allowed the government to reconstitute its public finances and acquire the funds 
needed for its ambitious social programs. 
3. The Bolivarian Revolution 
Chávez combined the ideas of Simón Bolívar, Ezequiel Zamora, and 
Simón Rodríguez and created a neo-populist (representing directly the “people” 
or “El Soberano” (The Sovereignty) as Chávez calls it) and sometimes-
authoritarian government. He integrated the military into domestic politics and 
used state resources to improve the quality of life for the poor.138 
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The revolution was not only domestic; it had a foreign component that 
relied heavily on the defense of the revolution by positioning Venezuela as a 
leader in Latin America. It opposed globalization and neoliberal economic 
policies and sought for the emergence of a multipolar world with new and 
different hegemonies.139  
To fulfill his objectives, the leader of the Venezuelan revolution depended 
on another revolutionary leader: Fidel Castro. Ever since Chávez was elected 
President, the ties between the two leaders have strengthened; in fact, Castro 
and Cuba’s support have been a fundamental component of the Bolivarian 
Revolution.140 It has helped Chávez gain the support of the people by blaming 
“Norte Americanos” for the country’s economic and social difficulties.141 While 
playing the part of a new leader capable of exporting the so-called revolution to 
other Latin America countries, Chávez has supported leftist candidates and 
organizations throughout South America. He has also tried to acquire a Fidel 
Castro like role as a leader of influence against the United States.142  
4. Coup Attempt 
Although Chávez earned huge popular support, one of the consequences 
of his new policies was the polarization of society and the radicalization of the 
opposition. The policies adopted by the new government opened a gap in 
Venezuelan society.143 In turn, these grievances led to a failed coup attempt in 
2002, which was conducted by the civil-military elite. Chávez reclaimed his 
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position after only two days.144 In the years to follow, Chávez kept on talking 
about the Bolivarian Revolution, but suddenly, in 2006, he started to use a new 
term, the XXI Century Socialism. 
E. XXI CENTURY SOCIALISM? 
When Chávez won the 2006 election, he promised a more radical turn into 
a socialist system. In the words of Heinz Dieterich, XXI Century Socialism is a 
participative democracy. Due to the “participative” character of it, this type of 
democracy embraces the four different areas of human social relations: 
economic, political, cultural, and the military. In this context, the state is no longer 
based on or controlled by a particular social class (oligarchy). It manages a wide-
range of functions that serve the interests of the “people.”  The economy is 
democratically planned in its micro and macro areas. Labor input determines the 
objective value and, in turn, this leads to an egalitarian economy in search of a 
social justice.145 
1. Bolivarian Circles 
Bolivarian Circles are the basic unit of Chavista organizations. They 
promote the Bolivarian ideology throughout the population, and facilitate the 
exchange of information and discussion. They are mainly structured using 
neighborhood organizations.146 The idea is for people to gather in their 
community, discuss their problems, and then channel them through the 
respective organizations for a solution. They are social organizations that attempt 
to operationalize the principle of participatory democracy embodied in the new 
Constitution. Some members of the opposition have denounced the circles and 
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have claimed that they have armed themselves and are acting instead as circles 
of terror.147 They have also accused them of receiving funding from the 
government and resembling the committees for the Defense of the Revolution in 
Cuba.148 Some circles even received military training from ETA members.149 
Bolivarian Circles are no longer limited to Venezuela. There are similar 
organizations established in different countries around the world, including Spain, 
the United States, Canada, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, Italy, and 
Brazil. Their purpose is to obtain international legitimacy and public support for 
the Bolivarian Revolution.150 
2. Cuban Missions 
Since one of the founding pillars of the revolution is the development of 
social programs aimed at the less-favored part of society, the government 
established different “missions” in the city neighborhoods. The ulterior motive is 
to gain the unrestricted support of the people. The “missions” consist of teams of 
doctors, nurses, teachers, sport trainers, etc, located in the poorest 
neighborhoods to improve the living conditions of the society. Fidel Castro helped 
institute these missions in 2003.  He sent thousands of experts (including 
“security experts for Chávez security”) from Cuba in exchange for low-cost and 
sometimes no-cost oil.151 The “security experts” have deeply infiltrated the 
military and security apparatus to help avoid another coup. Current figures 
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estimate that Cuba receives around 100,000 barrels of oil per day.152 They also 
benefited from the construction of a new refinery at Cienfuegos (Cuba).     
3. Bolivarian Militias 
The president possesses the ability to legislate by decree. He initially 
issued 48 laws. Recently, he issued 26 more. The laws vary and touch all 
aspects of Venezuelan life. One, the “Organic Law of the Armed Forces” created 
a new parallel military structure. Based on a concept of a civilian-military alliance, 
the law created a newly armed body that reports directly to the president. It is the 
National Reserve, otherwise known as the Territorial Guard or the Bolivarian 
Militia. Even members of the government saw this move as a counterbalance to 
the armed forces, designed to avoid another coup attempt.153 This organization 
not only defends national sovereignty, but it also carries out tasks in economic, 
social, geographic, and environmental development. Once again, it resembles 
the Cuban model, and it is not known if its purpose is only to support national 
defense or to achieve political and social control of Venezuelan society by 
intimidating the opposition.154 
4. Support to Leftist Groups and Terrorist Organizations 
Not only has Chávez been sympathetic to left wing organizations 
throughout the hemisphere, but also he has been supportive of organizations 
long considered terrorist groups. As noted early in his annual state of the nation 
address to the National Assembly in 2008, he asked the Colombian government, 
the governments of the Continent, and Europe to remove the FARC and ELN 
from their list of terrorist groups and recognize them as belligerent forces.155 The 
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purpose of his initiative was unclear until in a military operation, condemned by 
Venezuela, the FARC’s number two, aka Raul Reyes, was killed and his laptops 
were retrieved. Some documents on the laptop illustrated the supporting role that 
Chávez had been playing. Chavez wanted the terrorist groups recognized as 
belligerent forces to force the Colombian president Alvaro Uribe to negotiate a 
political settlement with the FARC. The FARC would then promote a candidate to 
take power.156 Back in 2004, the FARC’s “chancellor,”  Rodrigo Granda, was 
arrested in Caracas while participating in a congress of left-wing organizations, 
later known as Continental Bolivarian Coordinator, and deported to Colombia. 
However, Granda had Venezuelan citizenship.157  
There have been other instances of Chávez support of terrorist groups. 
Recently, the Spanish judge Eloy Velasco charged six ETA members, as well as 
some FARC’s members with attempting an assassination on Colombian 
government officers in Spain. In his indictment, he suggested the cooperation of 
the Venezuelan government in the collaboration effort between these two groups. 
One of the ETA individuals charged is a member of the Venezuelan government, 
Arturo Cubillas Fontan, who has lived in Venezuela for a long time. Some believe 
he has facilitated the link between the two terrorist groups.158    
As noted in the previous chapter, the primary source of the FARC’s 
funding is narcotrafficking.  A study of the FARC’s finances in 2003 concluded 
that the revenues produced by the drug business were around U.S. $691 
million.159 As Colombian government’s countermeasures in this area have 
improved, the amount of cocaine going through Venezuela has skyrocketed. 
 
                                            
156 Schoen and Rowan, The Threat Closer to Home, 89. 
157 Schoen and Rowan, The Threat Closer to Home, 90. 
158 “Venezuela Helped ETA and FARC Plot Against Uribe,” BBC News, March 1, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8543349.stm (Accessed September 29, 2010). 
159 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Republica de Colombia, Las Finanzas de las FARC, 
Bogota, 2005, http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/ 
descargas/Documentos_ Home/Finanzas%20de%20las%20Farc.pdf (Accessed September 29, 
2010), 5.  
 59
“The number of drug flights leaving Venezuela increased tenfold from 21 metric 
tons in 2002 to 220 metric tons in 2007.”160 To some extent, this has helped 
maintain the FARC’s finances. 
5. A New Bloc of Power – Oil, the Best Weapon 
In another effort to extend his power outside the Venezuelan boundaries, 
Chávez, has been using his country’s most important asset to gain and maintain 
support and build regional and transcontinental alliances. 
In 2005, Venezuela signed an agreement with some Caribbean nations to 
create PetroCaribe. It is simply a program designed to sell oil to these nations 
under favorable conditions and at good prices. It sometimes offers the possibility 
of paying with goods in equivalence.161 Venezuela created another initiative with 
Argentina and Brazil, called PetroSur. They also launched the ALBA (Bolivarian 
Alliance for the Americas) as a way to unify and integrate Latin America. At first, 
only Cuba and Venezuela participated, but with time, more countries joined the 
initiative. ALBA proposes preferential commercial treatment to under-developed 
nations. In addition, it does not involve of the World Bank (given the World 
Bank’s neoliberal leanings), and it openly opposes neoliberal programs. These 
agreements have helped the revolution to gain allies in its stance against 
imperialism. 
Overtly, Chávez has supported the campaigns of Latin American 
candidates who embrace his anti-U.S. message. Consequently, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Nicaragua have been his closest allies, especially Bolivia. Some people also 
argue that he has tried to support candidates in Argentina, Mexico, Costa Rica, 
and Peru.162  
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A clear example of his achievements is the growing utilization of UNASUR 
to deal with common issues of South America, rather than OAS where 
Venezuela is weaker.  
Venezuela has also increased its economic and diplomatic relations with 
Iran, China, and Russia. With the latter, they have not only engaged in 
commercial activities with the purchase of more than U.S. $6 billion in weapons, 
but they have also negotiated military agreements. The former shares their anti-
American stance and their interest in building nuclear plants with energy-driven 
purposes. They also share an interest in investment in different types of 
industries.163 
F. DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM OR AUTHORITARIAN SOCIALISM? 
It is true that the social programs have benefited a vast amount of the 
population, but the question remains: is it really a new form of socialism or is it a 
path to authoritarianism through the emulation of the Cuban revolution?  
In 2007, Chávez proposed some changes through a constitutional reform. 
This proposal included, but was not limited to, the elimination of presidential term 
limits, limitations on central bank autonomy, and more power for the state to 
conduct expropriations. When the package was submitted to the referendum, he 
lost. Chávez turned to an old phrase, “we have lost… only by now,” to express 
his displeasure with the result. Finally, in 2009, he won a referendum to eliminate 
the presidential term limits, allowing him to stay in office indefinitely, even though 
the polls showed the people did not want him to consolidate his power any 
further.  
Chávez has also managed to expand the Supreme Court of Justice from 
twenty to thirty-two judges, taking advantage of the opportunity to appoint the 
new judges from his supporters, thus controlling the judiciary.164  Also in a turn to 
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a “more” democratic State, Chávez called for the transformation of government 
coalition parties into a single party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela 
(PSUV). He also calls for the incorporation of social movements into the party; 
however, some parties are refusing, worried that it will lead to a single way of 
thinking.165 
One of the main issues addressed by Chávez during his campaign was 
the fight against the corruption embedded in the previous regimes. However, 
after ten years in government, Venezuela shows no signs of improvement. 
Furthermore, some founders of the MVR have resigned from the government, as 
they are tired of not achieving any real change.166 Every year, Transparency 
International conducts a study in order to rank the world’s countries in terms of 
corruption, one being the least corrupted and 180 the most corrupted. In year 
2009, the Corruption Perception Index indicated that out of 180 countries, 
Venezuela was 162.167 
Rank 
  
Country/Territory CPI 2009 Score Surveys Used Confidence Range 
180 Somalia 1.1 3 0.9 - 1.4 
179 Afghanistan 1.3 4 1.0 - 1.5 
178 Myanmar 1.4 3 0.9 - 1.8 
177 Sudan 1.5 5 1.4 - 1.7 
176 Iraq 1.5 3 1.2 - 1.8 
175 Chad 1.6 6 1.5 - 1.7 
174 Uzbekistan 1.7 6 1.5 - 1.8 
173 Turkmenistan 1.8 4 1.7 - 1.9 
172 Iran 1.8 3 1.7 - 1.9 
171 Haiti 1.8 3 1.4 - 2.3 
170 Guinea 1.8 5 1.7 - 1.8 
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Country/Territory CPI 2009 Score Surveys Used Confidence Range 
169 Equatorial Guinea 1.8 3 1.6 - 1.9 
168 Burundi 1.8 6 1.6 - 2.0 
167 Angola 1.9 5 1.8 - 1.9 
166 Congo Brazzaville 1.9 5 1.6 - 2.1 
165 Democratic Republic of Congo 1.9 5 1.7 - 2.1 
164 Guinea-Bissau 1.9 3 1.8 - 2.0 
163 Kyrgyzstan 1.9 7 1.8 - 2.1 
162 Venezuela 1.9 7 1.8 - 2.0 
161 Cambodia 2.0 8 1.8 - 2.2 
Table 1.   Corruption Perception Index 2009 (From Transparency International) 
Chávez’s proposal to exert control over the people and increase the direct 
involvement and control of the state over the economy is the antithesis of 
democracy and a free economy. The Index of Economic Freedom, established 
by The Heritage Foundation, illustrates that the country’s economy has 
decreased over the last few years (along with the economies of Ecuador and 
Bolivia) in comparison to other countries of South America (Chile, Colombia, and 
Peru).168  
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Figure 7.   Economic Freedom (From The Heritage Foundation) 
At the beginning of 2010, the Organization of American States published a 
report addressing achievements of Chavez’s government in illiteracy, healthcare 
and poverty. It also expressed concerns about limitations in the liberty of 
expression, freedom of the press, human rights abuses, political intimidation, 
impunity in cases of violence, authoritarianism, no real separation of powers, and 
a lack of inversion and sustainment of economic and energetic infrastructure. 
Chavez does not recognize the report as impartial.  
Chavez has nationalized many companies and industries, including hotels, 
steel and cement production, telecommunications, and department stores. In 
addition, the government oversees price controls on more than 400 basic food 
products as a way to control inflation. This has not worked, and the food 
companies have been operating at a loss, which has created food shortages all 
around the country.  
Venezuela’s political system has become a so-called Socialist Democracy, 
but in this process, the government has become more authoritarian than 
democratic, exercising control over the rights of the citizens and constraining the 
liberty of expression. In addition, the government has established dubious links 
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with rogue and left wing states, as well as with international terrorist groups, like 
the Colombian FARC and ELN, even giving them some sort of support. In the 
meantime, President Chavez has managed to import the Cuban model into his 
own government, trying to achieve a Cubanization of his country in order to 
become the heir of the Cuban revolution. Far from becoming a safe country, 
Venezuela now has one of the highest murder rates in the world; also, the DEA 
estimates that more than 200 tons of cocaine goes through Venezuela to United 
States, Europe, and Africa every year, making it the principal transit nation. 
Moreover, it is imperative to understand that Hugo Chávez imposes a strong anti-
American influence on the region and has been trying to gain sympathy from 
other South American countries to support both his stance and his continuation 
as president. So far, Hugo Chávez has the greatest accumulation of power of 
any Venezuelan president since 1958.169 In all respects, the so-called 
Democratic Socialism is nothing but an authoritarian government in disguise. 
G. CONCLUSION 
It is undeniable that Venezuela needed a social transformation in order to 
improve the quality of life of its citizens. It is also true that the Bolivarian 
Revolution was perceived by most of the people as the feasible solution of 
Venezuela’s complex problems due to its promises of change. After almost 12 
years of Chávez government, there have been improvements in some areas 
such as illiteracy, health care and poverty, but there have also been huge 
setbacks, such as limits placed on freedom of expression and the press, human 
rights abuses, political intimidation, and impunity in cases of violence. 
The creation of parallel-armed structures, such as the territorial and 
Bolivarian militias that report directly to the president, has only served to ensure 
that a coup would not happen again. During the process of the revolution, the 
President has been able to concentrate more power in himself than in any other 
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country in Latin America; the separation of powers is now only a blurry line in 
Venezuela. The support from Cuban advisors has been paramount in both 
previous achievements. 
Not all Venezuelan problems have been addressed or solved, especially 
the shortage of basic food products throughout the country. However, instead of 
dealing with these issues directly, the government has been more worried about 
expending resources abroad that would give them the support for a leading role 
in Latin America. The worst thing is that by trying to achieve that position, the 
government has been supporting also terrorist groups. The years ahead are 
increasingly going to be characterized by problems for Chávez at home because 
of his failure to deliver to the degree that he was expected to after over a decade 
in office.  
Ironically, the words uttered by Simón Bolívar (truly admired by Chávez 
and follower of his doctrine and precepts) when he addressed the Second 
National Congress of Venezuela in Angostura, on February 15, 1819, point to 
what Chávez has been doing and the political system that he is creating in 
Venezuela: an authoritarian government. 
The continuation of authority in the same person has frequently 
proved the undoing of democratic governments. Repeated 
elections are essential to the system of popular government, 
because there is nothing so dangerous as to suffer Power to be 
vested for a long time in one citizen. The people become 
accustomed to obeying him, and he becomes accustomed to 
commanding, hence the origin of usurpation and tyranny. A proper 
zeal is the guarantee of republican liberty, and our citizens must 
very justly fear that the same Magistrate who has governed them 
for a long time, may continue to rule them forever.170 
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VI. VENEZUELA’S BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION AS A SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The idea of creating a political change in Venezuela was born in the early 
1980s, when the Bolivarian Revolution began as the dream of four army officers. 
With time, it quickly gained more followers until it became a big underground 
movement. Even though some of its members wanted to take action 
immediately, the conditions were not appropriate until the beginning of the 90s. 
The Bolivarian Revolution occurred in two stages. The first began with an oath to 
Simón Bolívar in 1982 and ended with a failed coup attempt in 1992. The second 
began after Chávez was released from prison in 1994 and the political movement 
started. This chapter draws on the Political Process Model in order to understand 
what conditions were present in the Venezuelan society that allowed the 
Bolivarian Revolution to be born and later consolidate itself as Venezuela’s ruling 
party. 
B. EXPANSION OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Political Instability – El Caracazo 
At the end of the 80s, Venezuela, known as the American Saudi Arabia 
was facing a serious corruption problem. The government had to take extreme 
economic measures to maintain sustainability. This, in turn, led to a growing 
discomfort among the people. In February 1989, the government eliminated 
subsidies for basic food products, as well as fuel and public transportation. In 
response, the people rose up and rioted. Caracas was looted and sacked. The 
incident served to demonstrate the people’s unrest and Bolivarian revolutionaries 
took note and realized that the moment for action had arrived. The movement’s 
military leaders attempted a coup d’état three years later.171 It failed, but it gave 
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to carry out the coup. 
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them the publicity needed to become a political movement later on. The people 
began to see the Bolivarian movement as an appealing alternative to common 
politics. 
2. Enhanced Political Positions – Case Dismissed 
With new presidential elections after another coup attempt, Rafael Caldera 
won. One of his first official acts was to grant amnesty to Hugo Chávez and his 
comrades and dismiss the case against him. Chávez was never charged with a 
crime even though almost 400 people were killed during the coup attempt. Some 
authors believe that Caldera acted in this way to prevent a popular uprising.172 
His decision allowed Chávez to participate in politics. Following advice from Luis 
Miquilena, Chávez decided to enter the political arena using the democratic 
process. While the movement had no presence in the current government, the 
case’s dismissal gave Chávez an opportunity that he otherwise could have not 
achieved.  
3. Ideological Openness – Tired of the System 
There was an old adage that illustrates Venezuela’s growing discomfort 
with the ruling politicians, “Venezuela is a rich country, I am poor, therefore 
somebody is stealing my money.”173 The people’s distrust in the conventional 
political parties opened a gap to Chávez’s advantage. Chávez decided to 
transform his previous revolutionary movement into a political party using initially, 
“The hope is on the streets” as its slogan. He traveled around Venezuela 
listening to the grievances of all sectors of the population, building support for his 
movement, and promising a new era, an era without corruption, founded in social 
justice. He realized that the people actually supported him, as they were tired of 
the common politicians. The conditions were ripe for a radical change in 
Venezuela. “When Chávez entered the picture as forcefully as he did and began 
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to speak as forcefully as he did, nobody hesitated, not for a second. He was the 
perfect avenger, tailor-made for the disenchantment and frustration of the 
Venezuelan people.”174  
C. INCREASE IN ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES 
1. Education of Members – Left Wing 
In this particular movement, the education of its members played a 
fundamental role in creating the necessary ideological structure. The father of his 
friends, Jose Esteban Ruiz Guevara, influenced the founder of the Bolivarian 
Movement during his youth. Ruiz Guevara was a militant in the Communist party 
and told Chávez that the way ahead was to understand Marxism and consider 
the constructive function of the Red Army.175 Chávez also absorbed the ideas of 
Simón Bolívar and Ezequiel Zamora. In his years at the military academy, he 
refined his ideas by taking political studies. Later on, as a Captain, he was able 
to identify officers with similar ideas and bring them into his project. In the 
beginning, it was an idealistic one. Then he met Douglas Bravo, a former 
guerrilla leader and the head of the Party of the Venezuelan Revolution, wrote 
the revolution’s political project.176 After that, more communist militants joined the 
movement. The educational level of the group’s members played a major role in 
shaping the project. Most of the “conspirators” had university degrees, and many 
had thoroughly studied left-wing theories. With that mindset, they helped shape 
the project.  
2. Financial Resources of Supporters 
During the first stage of the project, the resources for the coup attempt 
came directly from the military. At that time, the movement did not have to rely on 
external economic support. However, during the second stage, when the political 
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project was established, the situation changed completely. When Chávez got out 
of prison, he did not have any resources available; he did not even have a house 
in which to live. He relied on support from old communist militants to start his life 
again. He also turned to Luis Miquilena, who urged him to use the democratic 
process to take over the presidency, and introduced him to certain members of 
the economic elite.177 Some believe that the FARC supported Chávez with U.S. 
$150,000 to start his political campaign.178 When the project became stronger 
and political leaders recognized its feasibility, Chávez’s movement (MVR) gained 
support from other left-wing political parties such as Homeland for All (PPT), 
Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), and Movement for Socialism (MAS). They 
shared resources, thus making possible the sustainment of the movement.179 
3. Organizations to Recruit from – Army and Left-wing Parties 
During the initial stage of the “revolutionary project,” Chávez took 
advantage of his position as a military instructor, teaching history in the 
Venezuelan Military Academy when he was a captain. While in this position, he 
identified cadets and officers who were suited for his project.180 The main pool 
for recruitment was the Army; however, when he met some communist militants, 
he understood the value of including them in his project. His own uncle, Narciso 
Chávez, from the Party for the Venezuelan Revolution, was among the 
militants.181 Although the incorporation of civilians into the revolutionary 
movement helped to create a political plan to follow, after the seizure of power, 
“Chávez had no interest in the participation of civil society, acting as a concrete 
force. Civil society could applaud him but not participate.”182  
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During the second stage of the “Bolivarian Revolution,” the situation was 
different for Chávez. He was forcefully retired from the Army along with his co-
conspirators, which left them no opportunity to use resources from the Army. He 
was convinced that he had to create his own political movement (MVR) in order 
to achieve power through the democratic process. His overt actions gained the 
support of most of Venezuela’s left-wing parties.  
4. Free Spaces – Safe Houses  
During the years prior to the coup attempt, the use of safe houses was 
paramount for the security and survival of the movement. Most of the houses 
used throughout the country belonged to members of the movement, and it was 
in these places where all the meetings concerning the action plans took place. 
Through these meetings, new people (supporters of any kind) were brought into 
the movement.  
5. Indigenous Groups – The Poorest 
The Bolivarian Revolution began and grew within the Venezuelan Army. 
From this group came most of the members of this revolutionary project, as well 
most of the resources used for the coup attempt.  
In the second stage of the “revolution,” the previous network of co-
conspirators was part of the political movement: however, the main targets for 
support were Venezuela’s poorest sectors of the population.183  With a campaign 
based mostly on solutions to poverty and corruption, the MVR was able to 
capture the receptive poor who were disenfranchised with a populist 
discourse.184 This sector of the society became the main constituents of the 
“revolution,” allowing Chávez to win the elections.    
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D. DEVELOPMENT OF INSURGENT CONSCIOUSNESS 
The main force that drove Chávez to create his “revolutionary project” was 
a profound sentiment of nationalism and anti-Americanism. He decided to work 
with a conspiracy against the government back in 1977.185 Very slowly and 
carefully, Chávez identified potential recruits within the Army who shared his 
beliefs. To bring them in, he drew on the ideas of Simón Bolívar. In fact, when 
the new members were sworn in, Bolívar’s oath against the powerful Spanish 
rule was repeated, only taking out the word Spanish after “powerful,” and 
referring to the empire of the north.186 Furthermore, he used Bolívar’s ideas to 
attract more people to the movement. He also focused on fighting the other 
enemies of Venezuela, hunger, corruption, indigence, unemployment, and the 
misuse of the nation’s immense riches.187 In an effort to create a plan to follow 
the coup, Douglas Bravo wrote a four-part strategy:  
First, use Venezuela’s oil as a weapon against U.S. capitalism and 
imperialism by convincing OPEC to limit production and raise 
prices. Second, ally with Islamic oil nations in a bloc against Israel 
and the United States. Third, stir up nationalism and militarism in 
Venezuela by using Bolívar as a symbol and thereby crushing the 
oligarchy. Finally, build on these successes to initiate a triumphant 
revolution in Latin America and the world.188   
Even though it was an appealing strategy, Chávez never considered it 
during the first stage of the revolution. However, he did implement it later as 
president.  
The congruence of Bolívar’s ideology and the desire to fight against the 
political system in order to transform it helped to develop the insurgent 
consciousness of the Bolivarian Revolution.  
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Later on in the political project, what drew the constituents to support the 
movement was the promise to end corruption, end social inequalities, achieve 
social integration, enhance the quality of public services, and improve security, 
especially in the cities.189  
E. CONCLUSION 
The conditions for the origin of the revolutionary process in Venezuela 
were present since the 80s. The increasing corruption and the deterioration of 
living conditions of the Venezuelans were the force that drove the project from an 
idealistic dream to a concrete reality. The coup attempt propelled Chávez and his 
movement into the public’s consciousness. Without the media exposure achieved 
at that time, his political rise would not have been possible. 
The use of the iconic Bolívar’s figure and ideology was a fundamental step 
to appeal to the Venezuelan’s nationalism, thus attracting more sympathizers 
and giving “the people” someone with which to compare Chávez.   
Even though he had the resources necessary for a coup, the second 
stage of the “Bolivarian Revolution” required the help of left-wing militants to put 
together the political project. Without their knowledge and orientation, the 
movement would not have achieved its main objective, the conquest of the 
Venezuelan presidency.  
The ideology of Bolivarianism has brought the FARC and the Bolivarian 
Revolution together. This topic is the subject of the next chapter. 
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VII.  LINKS BETWEEN FARC AND VENEZUELAN BOLIVARIAN 
MOVEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters discussed the history of the FARC, its latest 
developments, and the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela. This 
chapter explores the convergence of both organizations. The Colombian 
government has been striking the FARC very hard lately, however, there are 
some top members who are not accessible for targeting, since they have their 
camps in Venezuelan territory. In addition, even though the effort against 
narcotrafficking in Colombia has increased, the FARC is still able to use it as a 
financing source moving it through Venezuela as a transit country, but the main 
purpose is to attract international support and recognition.      
B. BOLIVARIAN CONTINENTAL MOVEMENT 
1. Bolivarian Camp for Our America 
As previous chapters explained, the FARC launched its own Bolivarian 
Movement during the tenure of the DMZ. As expressed by David, a former FARC 
member, once the movement launched, they made contact with the Venezuelan 
Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement and the Bolivarian Encounter for 2003 
materialized as a joint proposal.190 In an e-mail (June 26, 2003) discovered in 
Reyes’s computers, Ivan Marquez told the Secretariat members that President 
Chávez agreed with the event and pledged that PDVSA (July 8, 2003) would pay 
for the movement of 1,000 people from Maracaibo to Caracas to attend the 
meeting.191 The Bolivarian Continental Movement (MCB) began as a meeting of 
left-wing organizations from all over the American Continent, held at Fort Tiuna 
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(Venezuelan Ministry of Defense headquarters) in the outskirts of Caracas, back 
in August 2003. At that time, it was called Bolivarian Camp for Our America 
(Campamento Bolivariano por Nuestra America). The purpose was to keep 
current the ideas of Bolivar concerning the union of Latin America and the 
Caribbean and to support the Venezuelan revolution as a way to achieve the 
independence of Latin America from the “Empire.”  The primary conclusion was 
the necessity to create a bigger and better-structured organization in order to 
coordinate the work of the organizations throughout Latin America. The name of 
the new organization was the Bolivarian Continental Coordinator (CCB), and a 
new congress was scheduled for 2005.192  
2. I and II Congresses – Bolivarian Continental Coordinator 
They held the first congress in Caracas in 2005 with representation of 
more left-wing organizations. In the conclusions, a new board was proposed, 
selecting the Dominican politician Narciso Isa Conde193 as the President and 
Amilcar Figueroa (aka Tino)194 as one of the board members, as well as FARC’s 
commander Manuel Marulanda Velez, along with Fidel Castro, Hugo Chávez, 
Daniel Ortega, James Jones, Alfonso Cano and Ivan Marquez195 as Honorary 
Presidents.196  During the congress, all the participants approved the PCC 
maxim of “the combination of all forms of struggle” unanimously as a way to 
achieve and impose the Bolivarian (Marxist-Leninist) ideology throughout Latin 
America.   
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The second congress was held in Quito on February 26, 2008. The 
opening greeting was a video message from Raul Reyes, thanking everyone for 
their attendance to the event as well as their support for belligerency recognition 
of FARC and its withdrawal from the list of terrorist groups.197 Among the 
conclusions of the second congress were:198  
• The necessity to use all kinds of struggle, even non-pacific and civil 
disobedience, in order to change the current political system 
• Being supportive with all the processes of advanced reforms 
towards the socialist revolution and against imperialism, especially: 
• The Cuban revolution, the pioneer in the socialist revolution 
• The process towards the new revolution represented in the 
new Bolivarian power in Venezuela 
• The advanced political and social reforms in development in 
Ecuador and Bolivia 
• The Colombian process is of singular importance, not only due to 
its strategic location, but also because the congruence of new and 
higher levels of military and political development of the forces 
pushing for a change, as well as the incapacity of the actual regime 
to contain the growth of the armed insurgency 
• That it is imperative to demonstrate solidarity with the forces that 
are trying to displace President Uribe’s government, opening the 
way for the establishment of the New Colombia 
• The extraordinary value of Commander Chavez’s and the 
Bolivarian government’s posture, as well as Colombian Senator 
Piedad Cordoba,199 against Uribe as an instrument of the Bush 
administration and American imperial power 
• The FARC must be recognized as a belligerent force 
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• If the global war against terror were expanded to include Iran, 
Syria, North and South America, China and India, the CCB would 
join the fight. 
• The CCB should transform itself into the Bolivarian Continental 
Movement in order to face and defeat the imperialism and bring 
freedom to Latin America 
Three days later, Raul Reyes died when the Colombian Air Force bombed 
his camp in Ecuador. The Colombian Army retrieved his body and the soldiers 
provided on-site medical attention to some of the wounded that were found there 
including, among others, Lucia Morett Alvarez, a Mexican citizen who attended 
the Bolivarian congress. She was in Reyes’s camp to complete an investigation 
about Latin American culture.200 
In one of the e-mails found in Reyes’s computers, Ivan Marquez wrote to 
Marulanda and the Secretariat that the idea to convert the CCB to the MCB came 
from some Venezuelan partners. “We are growing” Marquez states, indicating 
not only the importance of moving into the international political arena,201 but 
most of all, FARC’s membership in the MCB (and MCB support of FARC).  
3. Bolivarian Continental Movement 
The congress that constituted the MCB met in Caracas on December 7, 
2009.202 Finally, the organization moved from being just an association of left-
wing movements to becoming in and of itself, a movement founded by FARC, 
and one that supports violence and armed struggle as a means for bringing 
about societal changes. Once again, the opening greeting was in charge of 
Alfonso Cano, one of the Honorary Presidents of the movement, who sent his 
message in video. During the FARC’s ninth conference, held in 2007, special 
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emphasis was made about having more presence throughout the continent. It 
was the first time the FARC spoke about the “big motherland.”203 In addition, the 
FARC admitted that they created the CCB through the Bolivarian Movement for a 
New Colombia with the support of revolutionary sectors of Venezuela as a 
movement to coordinate the left-wing organizations in America.204 In this 
congress, Carlos Casanueva, the movement’s general secretary, ratified Alfonso 
Cano as the Honorary President of the MCB.205 Once again, the request for 
recognition of the FARC as a belligerent force was made by the MCB.  
The Colombian President, Alvaro Uribe and the Commander of the 
Colombian Military Forces, General Freddy Padilla de Leon, expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the MCB’s proceedings. General Padilla requested the MCB 
reject the FARC’s message and stated that if the MCB was sincere about its 
intention to bring forth social change it should distance itself from FARC. 
Otherwise, it would be seen as an accessory to human rights violations and 
terrorist activities and raise doubts among other democracies concerning what its 
true ends and purposes are.206 The Colombian government, through the External 
Relations Ministry, requested in an official communiqué that the Venezuelan 
government clarify to the international community if it recognizes, approves, or 
tolerates the existence of movements or political parties that overtly support 
terrorism and organized crime.207 The Venezuelan government has yet to 
respond to this request. 
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C. SUPPORTING THE FARC 
1. Contacts with Venezuelan Officials 
During the final months of 2007, Chávez played a role as a mediator 
between the Colombian government and the FARC in an effort to achieve the 
release of political hostages held by FARC. During this process, Ivan Marquez 
met with Chávez a couple of times in Miraflores Palace; however, more topics 
were discussed under the table. In one email found in Reyes’s computers and 
dated November 20, 2007, Tirofjo tells the FARC’s Secretariat that the meeting 
of Ivan Marquez with Chávez was a success. In the meeting, Marquez explained 
to Chávez the FARC’s strategic plan as well as asked him for a U.S. $300 million 
loan (called by FARC “the dossier”), which Chávez agreed to.208 In a letter 
written by Marquez to Tirofijo, he told him that Chávez also ordered some 
generals to establish “rear-areas” for the FARC near the border with Colombia for 
rest, recovery and treatment of any wounded. He also set up some kind of a staff 
for that purpose. He also said that if President Uribe touched one of the FARC’s 
delegates, he would have a foe for life. In the words of Marquez, the relationship 
between the FARC and the Venezuelan Army is superb; they even have had 
established friendship with five top generals.209 In a subsequent meeting, 
Marquez informed Tirofijo on January 4, 2007, that he had met with two 
Venezuelan generals, Hugo Carvajal and Cliver Alcala, the Director of 
Venezuelan Military Intelligence and the Commander of Brigade 41, located in 
the border with Colombia. As a conclusion of the meeting, the generals offered to 
give FARC 20 rockets with the possibility of more, as well as including weapons 
for the FARC in Venezuela’s legal weapons shipments from Russia.210 According 
to Marquez, the liaison designated by Chávez to supervise the weapons deals 
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was Ramon Rodriguez Chacin, Venezuelan Minister of Interior. The following 
graph captures some of the events discussed previously linking the FARC and 
the Venezuelan government. 
 
Figure 8.   Link Diagram of FARC Network211  
2. Supporting Role – Finances and Weapons 
On January 20, 2007, a couple of weeks after the meeting with the two 
generals, Marquez reported to the Secretariat that he and Timochenko did 
receive the rockets; AT-4 85 mm antitank rockets, 2 launchers and 10 rockets 
each. The generals promised up to 1,000 more.212 The Colombian Army in 
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various FARC camps found parts of these rockets in the jungle during military 
operations in July 2008. After speaking with the manufacturer, Saab Bofors 
Dynamic, located in Stockholm, Sweden, the Colombian government learned that 
the weapons were legally sold to the Venezuelan Army some years ago.213 Both 
requested an explanation from the Venezuelan government, but it has yet to 
produce a convincing one.  
In an email dated September 6, 2007, Marquez wrote to the Secretariat 
that Tino (i.e., Amilcar Figueroa – member of the board of the MCB) brought him 
two Australian arms dealers that offered Chinese Surface-to-Air Missiles as well 
as AK ammunition, machine guns, and sniper rifles.214 Marquez also wrote that 
the plan would be carried out with the help of General Henry Rangel Silva 
(Director of Venezuela’s Intelligence Agency at that time) and Minister Ramon 
Rodriguez Chacin. The General would be in charge of providing documents to 
the arms dealers, and Chacin came up with a plan to deploy the weapons in the 
Amazon region, which is not closely guard by the military. 215  
According to Marquez, Rodriguez Chacin (aka El Cojo) was designated by 
Chávez to oversee “the dossier.” On October 6, 2007, after a couple of meetings 
with Rodriguez Chacin, Marquez informed the Secretariat that “the dossier” was 
not a loan but an act of solidarity from Chávez. On February 8, 2008, Marquez 
informed the Secretariat that Chávez (aka Angel) told him directly that he had the 
first 50 ready and in subsequent meetings, he would discuss the schedule for the 
rest of it,216 but most important, how to transfer the funds to the FARC. Some 
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funds would be given as a share in the country’s oil business as well as giving 
the FARC contracts with state entities through ghost companies.217  
Additional confirmation of the Venezuelan government’s support for FARC 
has come from Jesus Urdaneta Hernandez, who was one of the officers who in 
December 1982 made the oath with Chávez, participated in the 1992 coup and 
was one of Chávez’s closest friends. When Chávez was elected, Hernandez was 
given the position of Chief of the National Directorate of Intelligence and 
Prevention Services (DISIP),218 but after a year in office, he quit because of 
widespread corruption in the government and Chávez’s financial support of the 
FARC. He later confirmed that in 2000, Chávez proposed to send the FARC U.S. 
$300,000 in aid.219  
Another Chávez government official that is said to have links with the 
FARC is General Hugo Carvajal, the Chief of Military Intelligence General 
Directorate (DGIM). Besides the meetings with Marquez, General Carvajal has 
also met with Grannobles, the commander of FARC’s 45th Front in a ranch in the 
state of Barinas (Venezuela). In this meeting, the General provided Grannobles 
identifications for the members of his group in Venezuela, as well as protection 
and food. He also helped moving 21 guerrilleros from different locations 
throughout Venezuela by helicopter for the meeting in order to provide them with 
identification documents.220 In fact, when the Colombian National Police in the 
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Sombra), a member of the FARC’s General Staff, he had in his possession a 
free-circulation permit issued by the local authorities of the city of Machiques, 
located in the Venezuelan state of Zulia.221 
3. Camps in Venezuela 
For some time the Colombian government has believed that the FARC 
has had camps located in Venezuela. On March 19, 2010, German Vargas 
Lleras, a politician, announced that at least four camps were located in 
Venezuelan territory with the tacit approval of the Venezuelan government and 
were even being protected by the Army.222 He stated that the camps are located 
in the states of Tachira, Zulia and Apure, and that in one of the main camps, 
called “Asamblea,”  and belonging to Ivan Marquez, the Bolivarian Militias were 
being trained by the FARC. FARC defectors have been a valuable source of 
information about the location of camps in Venezuelan territory. Actually, in an 
OAS meeting held on July 22, 2010, Colombian Ambassador, Luis Alfonso 
Hoyos, presented evidence (videos, photos and maps) of these camps holding 
around 1,500 guerrilleros.223  
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Figure 9.   Location of Some FARC Camps in Venezuela (White Dots) 
The establishment of an international commission in order to travel to 
those places was requested by the Colombian Ambassador, but was denied by 
Venezuela, stating that there was nothing like guerrilla camps in those 
locations.224 Even though the Ambassador told the delegates that there were 
around 87 camps, he focused on those around the city of Machiques, in the state 
of Zulia,225 where Ivan Marquez, Jesus Santrich (Seusis Pausanias Hernandez), 
Bertulfo (Ermilo Cabrera Diaz) and Timochenko (all members of the Secretariat 
                                            
224 “Colombia, Venezuela trade Barbs at OAS Meeting.” CNN, July 22, 2010, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-22/world/colombia.venezuela.oas_1_roy-chaderton-revolutionary-
armed-forces-farc?_s=PM:WORLD (Accessed November 10, 2010). 
225 “Colombia Prueba que hay Campamentos de las FARC en Venezuela,” El Pais, July 23, 
2010, http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/colombia/noticias/colombia-prueba-hay-campamentos-
farc-en-venezuela (Accessed November 11, 2010). 
 86
and General Staff) were located.226 Because of these allegations, Venezuela 
broke diplomatic relations with Colombia without answering any of the issues 
raised at the meeting.227  
D. MORE TERRORIST GROUPS? 
1. Hezbollah Venezuela 
Besides the close relationship that the Venezuelan government has with 
Iran and Syria, in the northwestern part of Venezuela (La Guajira) a cell of 
Hezbollah has formed. In an effort to spread its ideology, Hezbollah has been 
indoctrinating people from an indigenous tribe called The Wayuu,228 in an area 
shared by Colombia and Venezuela. The group openly calls itself “Hezbollah 
Venezuela,” and it has succeeded in turning the Wayuu towards a radical form of 
Islam that can fuel terrorist violence.229 While proposing the establishment of the 
“kingdom of God” in Venezuela by imposing a theocracy by force of arms,230 its 
main message is against government corruption and rule of the oligarchy. 
On June 18, 2008, after an investigation made by OFAC, the Bush 
Administration accused Chávez’s government of providing cash and refuge to the 
militant Islamist group Hezbollah.231 The communiqué stated that a former 
Venezuelan diplomat in Syria and Lebanon and a Venezuelan-Arab executive 
were helping Hezbollah in its fund-raising and giving its group’s members a safe 
haven in Venezuela. Chávez denied any charges as well as Venezuelan Minister 
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for International Relations. Both said that the real terrorists were in the White 
House.232 One of Chávez’s opponents, Oswaldo Alvarez Paz, a former governor 
of the State of Zulia, also affirms that the government is involved in supporting 
terrorist groups as FARC and Hezbollah beyond just promoting ideological 
sympathy.233  
2. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna – ETA 
Spanish judge Eloy Velasco, of the National Court in Madrid, issued an 
indictment on March 1, 2010, against Arturo Cubillas, a Basque exile currently 
living in Venezuela.234 In the indictment, the judge stated that Cubillas, 
Venezuelan General Hugo Carvajal, and a faction from the Military Intelligence 
General Directorate have been helping a group from ETA get training from and 
with the FARC in camps located in Venezuelan territory. Cubillas is currently a 
member of the government, and his wife works directly for Chávez’s cabinet. 
Some FARC defectors affirmed that they met with ETA members in a FARC 
camp near the city of Machiques. They also noted that Venezuelan military 
officers accompanied ETA members, and that Arturo Cubillas was the one who 
facilitated the meetings, as responsible for the ETA cell in Venezuela. After 
Velasco’s complaint to the Venezuelan government, Chávez answered that no 
one was going to be extradited, and that Spanish investment in Venezuela could 
suffer.235 
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E. DRUG TRAFFICKING IN VENEZUELA 
Over the years, narcotrafficking became the main financing source of the 
FARC; however, due to the effort of various government agencies in 2009, the 
coca cultivation dropped 29%, production dropped 39%, and the interdiction 
program reported that it had seized 205 metric tons.236 In the 2010 report from 
the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs from the 
Department of State, Venezuela was considered a major drug-transit country. 
The high levels of corruption and the weak judicial system allowed the flows of 
drugs to the United States, Europe, and West Africa to increase dramatically.237 
A couple of FARC defectors, identified as Rafael and Marcelo, confirmed that the 
FARC not only uses Venezuela as a safe haven, but also as a transit point for 
selling drugs internationally:  
Different methods exist to transport the drug from Colombia to 
Europe, but what they all have in common is the participation, by 
omission or commission, of the Venezuelan authorities. 
The most direct route is the aerial one. Small planes take off from 
remote jungle strips in Colombia and land in Venezuelan airfields. 
Then there are two options, according to intelligence sources. 
Either the same light planes continue on to Haiti or the Dominican 
Republic (the US government says that since 2006 its radar 
network has detected an increase from three to 15 in the number of 
'suspicious flights' a week out of Venezuela); or the cocaine is 
loaded on to large planes that fly directly to countries in West Africa 
such as Guinea-Bissau or Ghana, from where it continues by sea to 
Portugal or the north-western Spanish province of Galicia, the entry 
points to the EU Schengen zone. 
A less cumbersome traditional method for getting the drugs to 
Europe in small quantities is via passengers on international 
commercial flights - 'mules', as they call them in Colombia. One of 
the guerrilla deserters I spoke to, Marcelo, said he had taken part in 
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'eight or nine' missions of this type over 12 months. 'Operating 
inside Venezuela is the easiest thing in the world,' he said. 'Farc 
guerrillas are in there completely and the National Guard, the army 
and other Venezuelans in official positions offer them their services, 
in exchange for money. There are never shoot-outs between Farc 
and the guardia or army.' 
Rafael said he took part in operations on a bigger scale, their final 
objective being to transport the cocaine by sea from Venezuelan 
ports on the Caribbean Sea. His rank in Farc was higher than 
Marcelo's and he had access to more confidential information. 'You 
receive the merchandise on the border, brought in by lorry,' he said. 
'When the vehicle arrives the National Guard is waiting, already 
alerted to the fact that it was on its way. They have already been 
paid a bribe up front, so that the lorry can cross into Venezuela 
without problems. 
'Sometimes they provide us with an escort for the next phase, 
which involves me and other comrades getting on to the lorry, or 
into a car that will drive along with it. We then make the 16-hour trip 
to Puerto Cabello, which is on the coast, west of Caracas. There 
the lorry is driven into a big warehouse controlled jointly by 
Venezuelan locals and by Farc, which is in charge of security. 
Members of the Venezuelan navy take care of customs matters and 
the safe departure of the vessels. They are alive to all that is going 
on and they facilitate everything Farc does.' 
Rafael described a similar routine with drug operations involving the 
port of Maracaibo which, according to police sources, is 'a kind of 
paradise' for drug traffickers. Among whom - until last week when 
he was gunned down by a rival cartel in a Venezuelan town near 
the Colombian border - was one of the 'capos' most wanted 
internationally, a Colombian called Wilber Varela, but better known 
as 'Jabón', which means 'soap'. 'Varela and others like him set 
themselves up in stunning homes and buy bankrupt businesses 
and large tracts of land, converting themselves almost overnight 
into personages of great value to the local economy,' a police 
source said. 'Venezuela offers a perfect life insurance scheme for 
these criminals.'238 
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The situation has deteriorated so much in Venezuela that the FARC is no 
longer the only organization involved in drug trafficking in the country. Colombian 
drug cartel kingpins are also able to operate their business from Venezuela. An 
officer from DISIP assured that in more than one opportunity, General Carvajal 
has provided drug traffickers and guerrilla members with Venezuelan legal 
identification documents and even with IDs from DGIM, which allows them to 
move and operate freely all around the country.239   
F. CONCLUSION 
Support for the FARC by the Venezuelan government has been 
repeatedly confirmed. The governor of the state of Tachira, Cesar Perez Vivas, 
also confirms the presence of FARC members in different counties of the state; 
the inhabitants who see guerrilleros walking fearless in these towns and villages 
report this, while the central government’s policy is to keep silent.240 As stated by 
Diego Arria, former Venezuelan Ambassador in the U.N., “Colombia used the 
OAS as an international scenario, not waiting for a reaction, but to show 
evidence to the world that Venezuela protects, shelters, aids and assists FARC 
and ELN.”241 Arria also stated that Chávez is no longer interested in confirming 
the accuracy of the Colombian denunciation, but instead threatens those who 
make such reports while continuing to support the guerrillas in Venezuela. 
It appears that Chávez’s Bolivarian revolution has begun to lose 
momentum in Venezuela, and except for Cuba, it has never garnered support 
from key regional players.242 Moreover, the years ahead are likely to become 
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increasingly difficult at home for Chavez because of his inability to deliver to the 
degree that he could have or at least was expected to after more than a decade 
in office.  This suggests that if the FARC, in the face of the dramatic reversal of 
fortune it has experienced since the late 1990s, owes its current survival and 
potential ‘comeback’ to its use of Venezuelan territory and Chavez's support, 
then the FARC is in deep trouble and the Colombian government is in a very 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. CONCLUSION 
It is important to remember the strategy drafted by Douglas Bravo before 
the Chávez coup attempt in 1992: 
First, use Venezuela’s oil as a weapon against U.S. capitalism and 
imperialism by convincing OPEC to limit production and raise 
prices. Second, ally with Islamic oil nations in a bloc against Israel 
and the United States. Third, stir up nationalism and militarism in 
Venezuela by using Bolívar as a symbol and thereby crushing the 
oligarchy. Finally, build on these successes to initiate a triumphant 
revolution in Latin America and the world.243 
As stated by Rafael, a FARC defector who used to operate in Venezuela, 
“FARC shares three basic Bolivarian principles with Chávez: Latin American 
unity; the anti-imperialist struggle; and national sovereignty.”244 This ideological 
link between both is perfectly symbiotic. For Chávez, exporting the Bolivarian 
revolution to Colombia through the FARC would help reduce the U.S. presence 
and influence in the region. For the FARC, it sees being sympathetic and open to 
the Venezuelan Bolivarian revolution helps guarantee it a source of aid and 
support for its strategic plan. FARC’s ninth conference brought to light two issues 
that are paramount for the organization: the procurement of Surface-to-Air 
Missiles as a way to neutralize the strategic advantage of the Colombian military 
forces and obtaining the money necessary to fulfill the strategic plan traced years 
ago. For both purposes, the alliance with Chávez is seen as necessary. Having 
the opportunity to use Venezuelan territory as safe haven gives FARC a serious 
advantage. Some of the Secretariat’s members live openly in Venezuela where 
they do not have to worry about their security as they would if they were in 
Colombia. In addition, through links with the National Guard and the Army, the 
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FARC has created a network for arms trafficking, either due to their sympathetic 
support or by bribing them. Not only are the promises to receive money important 
for the FARC, but also the tolerance and support of the Venezuelan government 
has allowed the group to move cocaine through Venezuela on the way to 
markets in Mexico, Europe and Africa. 
Moreover, in some of the emails found in Reyes’s computers, Chávez and 
former Colombian Senator Piedad Cordoba are mentioned as individuals who 
may be able to produce radical political change in Colombia. For example, the 
FARC believed that if it helped Chávez succeed in his role as mediator in the 
hostage release process proposed by Senator Cordoba, Chávez would achieve 
greater international recognition.  Then, after his January 11, 2008 speech in 
which he asked that the FARC be given belligerent status, the FARC would 
attract international attention and sympathy. Moreover, since Cordoba would play 
a major role in this plan, she could then petition that she be selected as the 
Liberal Party’s official candidate for the upcoming presidential election, and, with 
help from FARC, elected as the Colombian president. Since she sympathizes 
with the Venezuelan and FARC Bolivarian Movement, the FARC could then use 
her position to help it achieve the political participation and transformation it has 
sought for so long.245 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the FARC is not as strong as it used to be and has probably made 
itself more vulnerable by relying so heavily on Hugo Chávez and the Venezuelan 
government, it is still capable of wreaking havoc in Colombia. Thus, the 
Colombian government needs to address certain issues in order to hasten the 
FARC’s demise. 
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1. Address Social Inequalities – Taking Away the FARC’s Reason 
to Keep Fighting 
The FARC began its armed struggle in order to achieve change that would 
address social inequalities in Colombia. After more than 40 years, the group still 
uses this as the main justification for its existence. It is imperative that the 
government do all it can to create more equality within Colombian society. It can 
start by passing the two initiatives that are currently before the Congress that 
address state corruption and land reform. If the Congress approves both 
initiatives as laws, the FARC would have lost “its main reason” to keep fighting 
(forcing them to prove that what they say is the true reason for its existence 
instead of trying to get rich through narcotrafficking). 
2. International Campaign to Show the Real FARC 
In the past, the FARC had been conducting an aggressive international 
campaign in order to present the group as “freedom fighters,”  especially in 
Europe, to gain international support. This has been the main task of the 
International Front. Meanwhile, the Colombian government has been ineffective 
in countering this campaign. The government needs to conduct a more effective 
media campaign to show the world the true nature of the FARC, especially since 
the MCB currently endorses its armed struggle as legitimate. 
3. Fight FARC’s Finances 
The FARC left its founding ideology behind a long time ago; now, the 
group cares only for money. It is a terrorist group, “whose power and influence 
rest less on its political legitimacy and more in the benefits of having become the 




cocaine.”246 On this issue, the government needs to seek more international 
commitment, in not only the fight against narcotrafficking, but also against the 
companies that the FARC uses to launder money.  
4. Prosecute FARC’s Supporters 
The information contained in the FARC’s computers seized in different 
military operations (Raul Reyes, Mono Jojoy, Front 48, Fabian Ramirez, etc.) 
have proven to be a valuable resource for understanding the underground 
activities of FARC and the networks of supporters that the group has established 
not only in Colombia, but also internationally. The government needs to exploit 
this information, especially in the prosecution of the supporters of a group that 
only has brought terror to Colombian society. 
5. Monitor FARC’s Presence in Venezuela   
After years of troubled relations between Colombia and Venezuela, the 
tide may be changing. President Santos and President Chávez had a meeting 
the day after Santos took office. After the initial private meeting, Chávez’s 
position changed radically and the Venezuelan government signed security and 
cooperation agreements with Colombia to oppose terrorist and narcotrafficking 
groups. We can only hope that from now on the situation will be different for the 
FARC in Venezuela, and that the group will be expelled from the country. 
Nevertheless, it is in Colombia’s best interests to continue to monitor the FARC’s 
presence in Venezuela so that it can praise any help that Venezuela provides in 
the fight against the FARC or, if Venezuela continues to provide support for the 
FARC, denounce Venezuela once and for all. 
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